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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS ON MACROECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: A CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
Erdem, F. Senem
M. A. In Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Bilin Neyapti
August 1999
Developments in demographic factors affect the magnitude of several Social 
Security attributes, and have recently lead many countries to reform theii· systems. The 
most marked one of such reforms is the transition from Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) based 
systems to funded systems. This thesis discusses the effects of social security systems 
on a country’s macroeconomic performance by means of a cross-sectional study. It 
examines five main macroeconomic indicators: GDP growth rate, budget deficit, 
private saving rate, unemployment and inflation. It does so by using both thefr main 
macroeconomic determinants and the relevant social security attributes, such as 
dependency ratio, social security deficit, retkement ages, contribution rates, and public 
spending on social security. Our main conclusion is that many social security attributes 
significantly affect macroeconomic indicators.
Keywords: Social Security System, GDP growth rate, private saving rate,
budget deficit, unemployment, inflation, macroeconomic performance
ÖZET
SOSYAL GÜVENLİK SİSTEMLERİNİN MAKROEKONOMİK PERFORMANSA 
ETKİLERİ: BİR ZAMAN KESİTİ ANALİZİ 
Erdem, E. Senem 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Y.Doç.Dr.Bilin Neyaptı
Ağustos 1999
Demografik faktörlerdeki değişim, birçok sosyal güvenlik sistemi 
göstergesinin yarattığı etkileri değiştirmiş ve pekçok ülkeyi sistemlerinde reform 
yapmaya yönlendirmiştir. Bu reformlardan en fazla dikkati çekeni, Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG)’dan fonlamaya dayalı sistemlere geçiş olmuştur. Bu tez, sosyal güvenlik 
sistemlerinin makroekonomik performansa olan etkilerinin bii’ zaman kesiti analizi ile 
incelenmesidir. Beş temel makroekonomik gösterge analiz edilmiştir: Gayrîsafı yurtiçi 
hasıla (GSYİH) büyüme hızı, bütçe açığı, özel sektör tasarruf oranı, işsizlik oranı ve 
enflasyon. Bu çalışmanın amacı, belirtilen makroekonomik göstergelerin, ilintili diğer 
makroekonomik değişkenler ve anlamlı sosyal güvenlik değişkenleriyle -bağımlılık 
oranı, sosyal güvenlik bütçe açığı, emeklilik yaşı, prim oranları, sosyal güvenlik kamu 
harcamaları- tahmin edilmeye çalışılmasıdır. Çalışmanın temel sonucu, sosyal 
güvenlik değişkenlerinin makroekonomik performansı belirli bir şekilde etkilediği 
yolundadır.
Anahtar sözcükler: Sosyal güvenlik sistemi, gayrîsafı yurtiçi hasıla (GSYİH)
büyüme hızı, bütçe açığı, özel sektör tasarruf oranı, işsizlik 
oranı, enflasyon, makroekonomik performans
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For the past fifteen years. Social Security Systems have started to go through 
a transformation throughout the world. This was induced mainly by the 
developments in such demographic factors as the increase in life expectancy, fertility 
and mortality rates and dependency ratio. For instance, since the life expectancy has 
been lengthened in many countries, governments have to pay benefits for a longer 
period of time, resulting in higher burden on budget. Since the main component of 
Social Security System is the pension regime, due to those changes in demographic 
factors, the current structure of the systems leads to increasing financial strain on 
governments.
Among the goals of social security system are economic growth, income 
adequacy and equity for current and future beneficiaries. The three main roles of the 
social security system, as a saving program; social insurance program; and an income 
redistribution program, should be constructed so as to reach these main goals. The 
need for reforming social security systems has stemmed from the fact that existing 
systems fail to satisfy these goals and thus have had a distortionary effect on the 
macroeconomic indicators of the economy.
Many studies aim to explain how and why Social Security Systems may have 
negative effect on macroeconomic performance. These studies, which are generally
in the form of surveys, mainly focus on the effects on saving, capital accumulation, 
labor force participation, and economic growth. Most of the models are formed with 
regards to the "Life-Cycle Hypothesis". The main features of empirical studies on 
these issues are, however, that each study is concerned either with a single country 
example, based on time series data, or perform cross-country analysis using panel 
data by considering the differences of the social security systems with respect to 
financing methods. They compare funded and unfunded systems or private and 
public systems in general.
The main contribution of this study is to determine the attributes of social 
security system in general, and investigate the effect of those attributes on the main 
macroeconomic indicators. Hence, the current study closes a gap in the related 
literature outlined briefly above, which mainly compares different social security 
systems, rather than individual attributes with respect to macroeconomic 
consequences. To this end, we first identify the important social security attributes 
that may be common to different social security systems. We next assemble major 
data on these attributes and generate some of them. These attributes are dependency 
ratio, contribution rates of both the insured person and the employer; effective 
retirement ages for men and women; existence of unemployment insurance and the 
form of government intervention to the systems; deficit of social security systems; 
share of social security expenditures over total public spending; ratio of social 
security contributions to public spending on the system.
Next, we empirically investigate their linkages with the major 
macroeconomic indicators. As the indicators of macroeconomic performance, we 
choose private saving rate, budget deficit, unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and 
inflation. We form models for each of the macroeconomic variables.
Data we use for our empirical analysis are in averages over the five-year 
period between 1992-1997 for 29 developing and developed countries (see 
Appendices lA and IB). Since the analysis cover a large and variable sample, data 
unavailability, especially for social security attributes, limits the number of countries 
in our sample. Data analysis for these periods justifies the claim of increasing 
financial burden on budget. In the regression analysis of the models, we employ 
Ordinary Least Square Estimation (OLS), Two Square Least Square Estimation 
(2SLS), Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), and OLS with Principal 
Components estimation techniques.
Our main finding is that several social security attributes are significantly 
related with main macroeconomic indicators, and therefore with the macroeconomic 
performance. The results of the regression analysis for the saving model appear to be 
consistent with the existing studies. Moreover, the other models also yield mostly 
meaningful results, which align with relevant economic theories.
Chapter II provides an extensive literature review on the relationship between 
social security systems and macroeconomic performance. In addition, it provides a 
general survey of country examples. In Chapter III, we report the existing and 
proposed systems. We also examine the changes in demographic structure that are 
assumed to be the main reason of the problems in the current systems. We then 
classify the sample countries according to certain features of their Social Security 
Systems. In Chapter IV, we present the data and models. In Chapter V, we present 
the methodology employed in regression analysis and results. Finally, Chapter VI 
concludes, with some additional comments.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE SURVEY
The main types of social security systems referred to in this chapter are fully 
funded systems, Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems, Defined Benefit Schemes (DB), 
and Defined Contribution Schemes (DC). In PAYG, benefits accruing to the current 
beneficiaries are financed by current contributors or by budget transfers. In fully 
funded type, the contributions are chosen so as to accumulate a stock of capital that, 
any point in time should equal the present discounted value of future benefits minus 
future contributions of those currently in the scheme. DB schemes grant pensions on 
the basis of each individual’s history of covered earnings, irrespective of the 
payments that he or she may have made into the system. DC schemes credit each 
participants with actual payments made into the system much like an individual 
account.
There are many studies investigating the relation between different 
macroeconomic indicators and social security systems. We report in section II. 1, 
studies on the saving and social security systems are given in three parts; theoretical 
studies, household cross-sectional studies, and international cross sectional studies. 
In section II.2, we report the studies on the relation between labor market and social 
security systems. Section II.3, summarises the studies on pension systems and the 
literature on privatization of Social Security Systems, Section II.4 reports country 
survey studies.
II.1.Literature on the Relation between Saving and Social Security Systems
II.l.A. Theoretical Studies
Social security literature suggests that the effect of social security system on 
the saving rate is not clear-cut. Recent research has attempted to measure the effect 
of social security on saving by regression analysis and in the context of Overlapping 
Generations Model (OLG models). Each study, however, has also been severely 
criticised. Since saving could not be considered without consumption, " permanent 
income hypothesis" by Milton Friedman and " life-cycle hypothesis" by Franco 
Modigliani are closely relevant to the issue at hand.
The basic idea of the life-cycle hypothesis is that decisions about saving are 
made in the same way as all other economic decisions, that is, by an individual who 
attempts to maximise his well being given some constraints. Likewise, a worker 
begins his working career earning a relatively low income and saving little. As he 
gains experience and knowledge, his wage increases and so does his saving. At 
retirement, those savings become the source of his consumption. Thus, savings are 
used to smooth the consumption stream over the life cycle of the individual. This 
smooth path for individual lifetime income is maintained through dissaving.
Feldstein (1974) argues that social security has a damaging effect on saving 
and capital formation. Rather than looking at social security taxes, Feldstein analyses 
the process from the benefits perspective. Some individuals might view the expected 
benefits as an obligation of the government to provide an annuity. In this way, the 
individual has an asset: the government annuity that increases his wealth. Changes in 
wealth, in turn, alter consumption patterns and thus saving decision.
Feldstein points out that if social security induces early retirement through 
some provisions such that social security pays benefits only after a worker has 
reached a certain age, it may increase desired savings. This is because an increase in 
the length of retirement period increases the proportion of lifetime income that can 
not be consumed as earned. Thus, Feldstein argues that the combined effect of PAYG 
financing and the lifetime wealth increment of an immature system (which reduces 
saving) and the alleged inducement to early retirement (which increases saving) is 
theoretically indeterminate.
The major theoretical assault to the above comes from Barro (1974), whose 
formulation of the multigeneration model indicated that most of the attributes of 
social security, in principle, should have no effect on saving. Munnel (1974), on the 
other hand, argues that not all forms of personal saving, but principally that intended 
to support retirement (notably additions to pensions and to insurance company 
assets) would be affected by social security.
Another set of argument against Feldstein comes from Leimer and Lesnoy 
(1982), based on the following points. First, social security wealth data used in the 
study- social security wealth variable- suffers from computational errors due to 
computer programming. Correction of this error changes the estimated effects of 
social security on saving. Secondly, the assumptions are not demonstrably preferable 
and in some cases inferior to alternative assumptions. The assumptions are the form 
of expectations of individuals about the social security benefits and taxes. And the 
third one is that, the estimated relationship between social security and saving is 
acutely sensitive to the selection of study period.
Feldstein (1978) also examines the difference between private pension 
program and explains public social security in their likely impact on aggregate
savings. He explains some shortcomings of private pensions in terms of capital 
market (asset holding) behaviour and estimates the savings function with annual time 
series data under both the life-cycle theory and permanent income hypothesis. The 
two models are compared in such a way that conventional saving equation with any 
private or public pension program and the model with the appropriate variables 
(saving and disposable income) which contains the properties of private and pension 
programs.
Kotlikoff (1987) points out that he enormous expansion of the social security 
system over the last four decades has left the goveniment very heavily involved in 
determining the insurance of American households. While the growth of social 
security has been very substantial, it has also been gradual; this may explain the lack 
of focused debate on the pros and cons of government intervention in this area as 
well as evidence supporting the need for such intervention. He concludes that, in the 
area of saving and insurance, appropriate government intervention through social 
security can be readily justified on grounds of externalities and failure of insurance 
markets.
Hu (1987) provides a theoretical analysis of the effects of the insurance 
features of social security indexation on portfolio allocation and the stability of 
income and consumption of the retiree He uses a framework of a life cycle model of 
allocation under uncertainty. This paper shows that the magnitudes of such effects 
depends on the importance of social security in total wealth, the covariance of real 
portfolio returns with the inflation rate and, more importantly, whether there exists 
market failure in providing for inflation insurance.
Cready and Van de Ven (1997) examine the conditions under which a 
compulsory PAYG system is superior to the use of private savings by using the two-
period overlapping generations model. Model shows that a transfer system can be 
superior to the use of private savings if the sum of the rates of growth of population 
and real earnings exceed the real rate of interest. This model also meets with a 
declining population (population ageing). Furthermore, the basic two-period model is 
extended to allow for labor supply responses to taxation whereby an attempt to raise 
revenue in order to finance current pensions introduces distortions into labor supply 
and a reduction in tax-base.
II.l.B.Household Cross-sectional Studies
In order to examine how social security affects saving, economists have 
examined survey data on individual households as well as aggregate statistics. 
Cross-sectional data allow strong tests of the validity of the life-cycle model, with 
regards to the assertion that social security reduces saving rates.
Several cross-sectional studies have found that different types of social 
security systems, such as defined benefit; defined contribution; funded or unfunded 
systems, have caused little or no change in saving or private asset holdings or have 
actually increased them. Kurz (1989) reports that different social security systems 
have very small effects on asset holdings, which depend on the group under study 
and the mathematical forms of the equation used in the statistical estimation.
Hausman and Diamond (1984) estimate an individual model of wealth 
accumulation (and decumulation after retirement) with the first 10 years of panel data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men (NLA) for U.S. to examine 
the response of savings to pension systems. This individual model consists of three 
components: a. Continuous time model for retirement behaviour; b. Life cycle type
specification of individual wealth accumulation and decumulation after retirement ;c. 
Individual saving propensities as a function of permanent income, expected pension 
and social security benefits and demographic factors. The results are strongly in 
support of life cycle hypothesis and permanent income hypothesis. Moreover, the 
findings indicate that, the presence of pension and social security benefits has a 
significant effect on retirement behaviour where there is a strong trend towards early- 
retirement.
Gustman and Steinmer (1998) develop an argument against Life Cycle 
Hypothesis. They examine the composition and distribution of total wealth for a 
cohort of 51 to 61 years old from the Health and Retirement Study ( RHS)', and the 
role of pensions in forming retirement wealth. The finding is that, the ratio of wealth 
to lifetime earnings is no higher for people with pensions than that for people without 
pensions. However, heterogeneity is quite important. Multivariate regressions 
relating total wealth to pension coverage and pension value, which standardise for 
sources of heterogeneity, suggest that pensions cause very limited displacement of 
other wealth, if any. These findings are not consistent with a simple life-cycle 
explanation for savings.
IL1.2.International Cross Sectional Studies
Because saving rates differ widely from one country to another, it is 
tempting to examine whether variations in social security benefits help explain these 
differences. We note mainly six studies for the 1980's, two of which are by Feldstein 
and Inman (1977, 1980), who find an association between high social security
' RHS is nationally (US) representative survey o f over 7600 families who have at least one member 
born from 1931 to 1941.
benefits and low personal savings. Three studies that find no association, including 
one by Barro and MacDonald (1979) and one by Kopits and Gotur (1980) that finds 
industrial countries public pensions for the aged increase saving. They also find that 
the other social security benefits (notably health insurance, family allowances, 
unemployment insurance and etc.) reduce saving, and that social security taxes 
increase saving.
By considering all these studies, one important instrument for increasing 
national saving is the reduction in government deficit. It might be argued that 
creating a large surplus in the social security trust funds is a good way to achieve this 
goal. By reducing social security benefits or boosting social security taxes, one 
would add directly to national saving, if there were no offsetting effects of the kind 
predicted by the multigenerational model would predict. An important conclusion 
made by Aaron (1982) is that the evidence does not support the position that 
reductions in social security benefits would be effective in increasing private saving. 
Previously mentioned studies done by Feldstein and Inmann (1977,1980) could be 
reconsidered in light of the Campbell's (1977) study that suggest that more saving 
arises under private pension plans. Workers who are covered by private pension 
plans have an economic incentive to retire earlier than they would otherwise. But 
when they retire their wealth will drop and they must save more to cover the 
additional years of retirement. So it is possible to have two effects: first one is that 
the substitution of social security benefits or wealth for private saving and the second 
one is that, the early retirement of beneficiaries. The former one decreases the 
amount of private saving while the latter increase saving.
Since age of retirement might be a factor for saving decision, it seems 
appropriate to consider it in the aggregate saving analysis. Munnell (1974) studies
10
this subject as a doctoral dissertation. She investigates the impact of the two 
offsetting forces under discussion. The first one is the effect of social security benefit 
acting as an asset that substitutes for private savings. The second one is early 
retirement, which generates a need for more saving to last over the increased 
retirement years.
Hurd (1990) mention two important factors about the regression studies on 
the relation of social security systems with the savings. The first one is that, 
quantitative results of such studies are sensitive to the structure of the model and the 
selection of time periods which means that this period is important in the 
interpretation of the magnitude of the relation between social security and the 
savings. Secondly, the studies rely on variables whose construction makes them 
sensitive to alternative assumptions. These constructed variables for social security 
wealth may in fact be serving as a proxy for other economic effects. Unemployment 
insurance , private retirement program, medicare and other social programs have 
been the driving forces in the economy, and that the constructed variables are really 
measures of their influence. Another point that is indicated by them is that 
dependency ratio (ratio of number of retired to number of active worker) has 
increased as educational experience, which is investment in human capital. These 
factors may influence the saving decision.
Besides those previous studies, many recent studies examine the effect of 
social security attributes on saving. One of these is by Roseveare, Leibfnitz and 
Fore (1998) who examine the impact of ageing on national saving- private and 
government- on a survey base by keeping life- cycle theory in mind. Based on an 
analysis by IMF(1996) for the OECD countries, overall effects of ageing on national 
saving could be significant together with sharp decrease in government saving.
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Applying coefficient for the demographic effect on private saving for industrial 
countries, the increase in the dependency ratio of almost 20 percentage points as 
projected leads to a decline in the average private saving rate of the OECD area by 
around 6 percentage points betw^een 2000 and 2030, particularly marked in Japan, 
Germany and Italy. By adding Ricardian equivalence effects as 50 percentage, this 
decline in national saving becomes 8 percentage.
Another study by Baillu and Reisen (1998) point out the difference between 
the effects of funded pension systems and unfunded pension systems on aggregate 
saving. Using OLS and 2SLS over the 1982-1993 period, the author find that major 
features of pension design affect saving, that funded pension schemes should be 
mandatory rather than voluntary. Mandatory pension schemes that effectively cover 
the low-savers group will not only simulate savings, but they also act as important 
policy vehicles to help make retirement income levels and wealth distribution more 
equal between low and high savers.
Similar to study by Baillu and Reisen (1998), Edwards (1995) examines the 
reason of the difference in the saving rates across countries using the instrumental 
variable estimation method. He finds that government-run social security systems 
affect private saving negatively and percapita growth is one of the most important 
determinants of both private and public savings. Replacement of government-run 
(partially funded) systems by privately run capitalisation systems will tend to result 
in higher private saving rates. Furthermore, another result according to analysis is 
that, while private savings respond to demographic variables, social security 
expenditures, and debt of the financial sector, government savings do not.
Kohl and O'Brien (1998) also examine the effect of different types of 
pension systems on public and private saving. They underline two important
12
findings: unfunded public pension systems reduce national saving and tax-favoured 
private saving schemes increase national saving.
II.2.Literature Survey On Labor Market
For the last few decades, the population in industrialised countries has been 
aging rapidly and individual life expectancies have been increasing. At the same 
time, workers have started to leave the labor force at younger ages. In some countries 
the labor force participation rates of 60 to 64 years old have fallen by 75 percentage 
over the past three decades. This decline in labor force participation magnifies 
population trends, further increasing the number of retirees relative to the number of 
working persons and, thereby, increasing the dependency ratio. The changes in 
demographic factors with respect to countries and time are given in Appendix 2.
The most important problem of the social security systems and the need for 
the reforms arises from the correspondence between the retirement decision and the 
trends in labor force participation. There are many studies on this subject especially 
on individual country basis. Two important features of social security plans appear in 
these studies to have an important effect on labor force participation incentives. The 
first is the age at which benefits are available, which is called as " early retirement 
age", and the second one is the social security wealth.
As pointed in most of the studies mentioned above, the most important 
problem of unfunded system is the generosity of its benefits. The study done by 
Lubyova and Ours (1997) reach this result by examining the tightening of the 
benefits in the restructured Slovak unemployment benefit system. They show that
13
this policy is needed due to the increase in unemployment rate as in most of the 
European countries.
Studies by Kapteyn and Vos (1998), Blundell and Johnson (1998), Borsh 
and Schnabel (1998) examine the labor force participation and employment 
dynamics for Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany, respectively. According 
to a detailed survey of those countries' security systems, they point out that the basic 
reason of the change in labor force participation is the introduction of new 
arrangements that created incentives to retire. Dependency ratio is given as the main 
important item in the economic consequences of the countries. Netherlands, however, 
is stated to be less problematic in the financing of future retirement benefits due to its 
fully funded occupational pension plans. For United Kingdom, labor market 
behaviour is changed dramatically since 1970's. The relative generosity of benefits 
and the incentives, which they create, combined with the reduced demand for 
unskilled labor, play an important part in observed fall in the labor force participation 
rate. Increases in pension wealth influence early retirement heavily.
German PAYG system similarly appears under severe pressure due to its 
generous benefits. Already, Germany has a sharp increase in the contribution rate to 
the social security system. Due to generosity of the system, labor force participation 
has a sharp decline and the new arrangements due to social security taxes induce 
early retirement rather than late retirement. Here, population aging shifts the 
majority voting towards PAYG due to its generosity rather than fully or partial 
funding. Blundell and Johnson (1998) argue that for the implementation and the 
adaptation of the transition from the PAYG to partial or fully funded system requires 
a considerable time and sufficient capital accumulation.
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Blau (1994) finds out that labor dynamics at older ages are important 
including using quarterly data from the Retirement History Survey (RHS)^ which 
includes duration and spell occurrence dependence, and work experience effects. 
These effects are robust to nonparametric controls of unobserved heterogeneity. The 
estimates indicate that social security benefits have strong effects on the timing of 
labor force transitions at older ages, but that changes in the level of social security 
benefits over time have not contributed much to the trend of earlier labor force exit.
Kruger and Pischke (1992) uses aggregate birth year/calendar level data 
derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS)^ to estimate the effects of Social 
security wealth on the labor supply of older men in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
analysis focuses on measuring the impact of the 1977 amendments on the Social 
Security Act, which creates a substantial and unanticipated reduction in the social 
security wealth for individuals bom after 1926. This differential in benefits has 
become known as the benefit notch. Results indicate that labor supply continued to 
decline for the "notch babies" who received lower social security benefits than earlier 
cohorts.
Friedberg (1998) explores whether the Old Age Assistance (OAA) program 
of the US, the first means tested program for the elderly induces individuals to retire 
from work. Using individual records from the 1940 and 1950, he estimates that OAA 
has a substantial effect on Labor force participation. He argues that, a major problem 
in quantifying the impact of social security or pensions on retirement arises because 
benefit levels do not vary across the population randomly but depend on past 
earnings (replacement ratio“'). Studying OAA gets around this problem because
- US Social Security Administration’s Longitudinal Retirement History Survey contains infomration 
on a random sample of individuals who were aged 58-63 in 1969.
 ^U.S. Department o f Labor
'' proportion o f the average wage that is replaced by the average pension.
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benefit levels vary across states. The conclusion is that the growth of means tested 
transfers for the elderly play a significant role in the trends toward early retirement. 
By using additional data from younger people shows that, the impact of pension 
generosity would result in higher and higher decline in the labor force participation 
rates in the following decades.
Samwick (1998) estimates the combined effects of Social security and 
pension benefits on the probability of retirement in a cross-section of the population 
near retirement age. He also estimates accrual rate of retirement wealth according to 
the model of the retirement decision. Besides this, in econometric model of 
retirement, he estimates in which the logic of "option value" model of retirement, 
developed by Stock and Wise (1990). Among the demographic variables, he finds 
that only the age is significantly related to retirement probability. The main finding is 
that both the option value of retirement and the accrual in retirement wealth are 
statistically significant in reducing the probability of retirement.
Kahn (1988) argues that it is important to take realistic account of how 
recipients evaluate potential benefit flow. Thus he presents a simple retirement 
model, in which liquidity constraints prompts individuals to use higher than market 
discount rates in evaluating future pension benefits. As a consequence, even an 
apparently actuarially fair early retirement benefit could (on average) discourage 
continued work. Using data on individual retirement decisions, he finds a support for 
the argument that this phenomenon contributes to some of the observed increase in 
early retirement.
Van Rijckeghem (1997) develops and calibrates a simple general 
equilibrium, which is characterized by different wage setting mechanism for skilled 
and unskilled labor, one-sector, three-factor general equilibrium model with capital
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for the French economy. Her simulation results indicate that targeted reductions in 
employer social security taxes have six times as large an effect on employment as 
untargeted reductions for equal initial budgetary cost, while employee social security 
tax reductions have a negative effect on employment. She also points to the presence 
of "self-financing", whereby reductions in various tax rates lead to lower budget 
deficits in the long-run, as a result of an expanding tax base and lower unemployment 
insurance outlays.
Borsh (1998) examines the decline in old age labor force participation 
throughout Europe by using qualitative and econometric evidence for the strength of 
the incentive effects on old age labor supply. He shows that a significant part of this 
problem is homemade: most European pension systems provide strong incentives to 
retire early, thus, the correlation between the force of these incentives with old age 
labor force participation is strongly negative.
II.3.Literature on Pension Systems
Studies show that pension systems resulted in different effects on 
macroeconomic indicators. Some of the new studies have examined major properties 
of pension systems and found the superiorities of each system as compared to 
another.
Cichon and Latulippe (1997) address three models. The first one is a social 
budget model, which maps the macro socioeconomic environment as well as the 
social protection environment of pension systems. The second one is a pension 
model used to assess the long-term financial implications of alternative benefit
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provisions and alternative financing options. The last one is an income distribution 
model that determines the distributive aspects of pension system or reform options.
The following studies include arguments for and against the funding of public 
pensions with a view to establishing whether there is an economic basis forjudging 
funding to be superior to Pay-as-you-go (PAYG).
Hemming (1998) argues that funding does not have a clear advantage, and 
the case for a shift from PAYG to funding is thus an uneasy one. There is, 
nonetheless, a growing advocacy of funded public pensions as part of an ideal 
pension system, which raises the general issue about the role of the public sector in 
pension provision in a Defined benefit (DB) and Defined contribution (DC) base.
Congio, Cottarelli and Cubeddu (1998) review developments in pension 
systems in eleven transition economies during the 1990's, highlighting the forces 
behind their rapid weakening. They point out that, due to higher dependency ratios 
reached by mid-1995, countries change their policies not only by raising mandatory 
retirement age and by tightening early retirement rules, but also by changing the 
nature of pension system. The main goal thus becomes to increase the link between 
contributions and expenditures. Most of the transition countries (for example 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, FYR Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Slovenia) are 
considering shifting or have already shifted ( for example, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, 
Kazakhstan) from the traditional defined benefit PAYG system to defined 
contribution fully funded systems. Expectation of high yields of the funds with 
respect to the implicit yield of PAYG, and the high power of funds to protect 
pensioners during the transition with respect to PAYG are the main reasons for this 
transition.
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Another approach comes from Kramer and Li (1997) with regards to the 
significant effects of PAYG public pension system on macroeconomic behaviour. 
The authors, in the context of a stylised model of the Canadian economy, illustrate 
some of these effects, which are important in weighing options for reforming public 
pensions. They, in addition, show that introducing such a system can reduce 
aggregate saving, income and wages and increase interest rates. Furthermore, they 
argue that a significant part of the distortion can occur because benefits are not 
explicitly linked to contributions and that creating a linkage can reduce the 
distortions associated with a wage tax that funds plan contributions.
Maisonneuve and Mylonas (1999) examine the financial strain created by 
PAYG system as population ageing. This study evaluates the prospects of the Greek 
pension system. This study is important for developing a basis for critical evaluation 
of social security systems. The main focus of the paper is on the factors of the Greek 
PAYG system that could potentially result in its future unsustainability.
Willmore (1998) points out that social security reform by itself is not likely 
to generate increased savings or growth, but it is essentially a zero sum game in 
which some participants gain at the loss of others. Arguments for reform of social 
security are usually from economic point of view, while in reality they are political 
arguments for changing the distribution of costs and benefits. He argues that, as 
shown by most of the empirical analysis, choice of a pension regime in itself has 
little impact on savings, investment or growth, but it can change markedly the 
distribution of income and wealth. Pension reform, for this reason, more a "political" 
than an economic issue.
Homburg (1990) criticises the paper by Breyer (1989) which considers the 
problem of efficiency of unfunded systems (PAYG) pension schemes. He finds that
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these schemes are intergenerationally efficient in Pareto's sense when the rate of 
interest permanently exceeds the growth rate. In Breyer's model, contributions to 
that system, are introduced as lump-sum taxes and the pensions are lump-sum 
transfers, but in reality contributions to PAYG are never raised as lump-sum 
payments. Thus, this paper show that an unfunded scheme induces distortions and 
can completely be abolished in finite time without inflicting damage upon any 
generation.
Furthermore, Heller (1998) argues that there are significant risks, limitations 
and complications associated with reliance upon mandatory defined 
contribution/fully funded schemes as the dominant public pension pillar. Policies to 
limit risks may lead in the government to playing an important financial role in the 
provision of social insurance. For many countries, the principal source of old age 
support should thus derive from a well-formulated, public DB pillar, with a 
significant amount of prefunding. A Defined contribution /Fully funded pillar can 
play a useful supplemental role in a multi-pillar system for the accumulation of 
pension savings.
Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (1997) compare two general methods of 
privatizating social security system: forced participation in the new privatised 
systems versus allowing people to choose between the new system or remaining in 
the current social security system. Simulations are performed using a large-scale 
perfect-foresight OLG simulation model that incorporates both intra-generational and 
inter-generational heterogeneity. Both methods lead to large long-run gains for all 
life time income classes despite the intra-generational progressivity of social security. 
But they differ in their short run effects due to adverse selection associated opting 
out. Relative to forced participation that preserves accrued liabilities; the opting out
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method performs surprisingly well both in its distributional impact and speed of 
convergence. Opting out tends to do a better job at protecting the welfare of the 
initial elderly, even though the forced participation method is designed to fully 
protect their value of social security benefits. These results suggest that giving people 
freedom of choice might actually generate more favourable outcomes than mandates.
Brown (1997) presents the similarities between the funding of an individual 
pension plan and PAYG social security systems. In each plan, the total expected 
value of benefits can exceed the total expected value of contributions. This is true for 
the individual pre-funded plan. He presents arguments to show that a fully funded 
scheme is no more secure economically than PAYG scheme. Both schemes rely on 
the ability of the economy to create and transfer wealth. That is, the social security 
does not lie in privatization.
Kotlikoff, Smelters and Walliser (1998) use a large-scale OLG model that 
features intragenerational heterogeneity to show that privatising the U.S. Social 
security system could be done on a progressive basis. The paper compares achieving 
progressivity as part of privatization reform by a) providing a PAYG financed 
minimum benefit to all agents at retirement independent of their contributions and b) 
matching contributions to private retirement accounts on a progressive basis. 
Although a PAYG financed minimum benefit can enhance progressivity, it comes at 
the cost of substantially smaller macroeconomic and welfare gains. The reasons are 
twofold: first, the ongoing unfunded liability to pay for the minimum benefit is 
roughly half of the unfunded liability of the current Social security system. 
Maintaining this liability limits the effect of privatization on saving and capital 
accumulation; second, the tax financing the flat minimum benefit is completely 
distortionary since the benefit one receives is independent of what one contributes. In
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contrast, matching workers contributions on a progressive basis can achieve an 
equally progressive intragenerational distribution of welfare. But it affords much 
higher long-run levels of eapital, labor supply, output, and welfare.
II.4.Literature on Country Studies
De Mesa and Bertranou (1997) compare two of the most important 
structural reforms of Social security reform in Latin America: The Chilean private 
fully funded system, and the public/private Argentian "integrated" (PAYG/fully 
funded) program. Chilean pension reform affects most of the developing and 
developed countries. The Argentian model has important differences from the 
Chilean model in several respects: A model has (a) more inter and intra-generational 
solidarity; (b) relatively lower transition costs to be covered by the state; (e) higher 
coverage of self-employed workers; (d) more comprehensive regularity framework; 
and (e) less gender inequality. Given these elements, the Argentian pension model 
offers new insights to countries currently reforming their pension systems.
Hamann (1997) describes the pension reform in Italy in 1995. This reform 
modifies the mechanism for computing retirement benefits, merged the old age and 
seniority pension schemes into a single seheme but also penalises early retirement. 
Hamann argues that, new system has many long-run improvements such as actuarial 
soundness, to postpone retirement; a closer link between contributions and benefits; 
and a less heterogenous treatment of different categories of workers. This reform, 
however, has some weaknesses, such as high contribution rates for dependent 
workers and not addressing the problem posed by demographic transition.
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Coulter and Heady (1997) examine social security reform for transitional 
economies, using the Czech Republic as an example. They state that replacement of 
universal benefits by more generous but income tested benefits helped the poor, 
while reducing government expenditure. However, it also harmed those slightly 
above the poverty line and increased the combined marginal rates of tax and benefit 
withdrawal, especially for the poor. Changes to benefit withdrawal rates before the 
reforms were enacted succeeded in improving targeting without increasing marginal 
tax rates. The implications for other transitional economies are that income tested 
benefits are practical and effective, but careful design is needed to maximise their 
benefit.
Branco (1998) argues that despite increasing fiscal burden, the public 
pension systems of BRO countries (Baltics, Russia, and other countries of Former 
Soviet Union: Latvia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine) are failing to provide adequate 
social protection. Although there is a broad consensus about the need for pension 
reforms, BRO countries are debating whether to embark on systematic reforms or 
whether to correct the distortions in their PAYG pension systems. The paper reviews 
the measures taken by BRO countries during the transition period to address their 
pension problems and examines the options for further reform. It makes a strong case 
for a gradual reform approach aimed at establishing a multi-pillar system over the 
long run, but initially focus on the implementation of "high-quality" reforms of the 
PAYG system.
A prediction of the basic permanent income hypothesis/ life cycle model is 
that an unexpected increases in future income produces an immediate increase in 
current consumption. Levenson (1996) tests this prediction using data for Taiwan. 
The 1985 Labor Standards Law in Taiwan granted all employees in covered
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industries a windfall retirement severance benefit. The results of this study indicate 
that consumption did not increase immediately for those who were granted that 
windfall, relative to those who receives no windfall. Moreover, consumption for 
those who are granted is reduced.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
Throughout the world, there are many different social security schemes. In 
the following section, we define these schemes. In section III.2 we present the basic 
criteria used in the evaluation of those different schemes. In section III.3, we examine 
the history of transition from PAYG to funding, which is observed in many country 
studies as stated in the literature survey above (many countries are also in the process 
of implementation of funding systems). In section III.4, we classify the countries 
used in our empirical analysis according to type of the defined systems and their 
social security system features. In section III.5, we explain the relation between 
social security systems and economic performance, which lead us to perform our 
empirical analysis.
III.l. System Definitions
The system classifications are provided by " Social Security Throughout the 
World", published by ISSA- International Social Security Association in Geneva 
(1997).
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IlI.l.A. Systems According To Their Benefit Distributions
The following systems are grouped according to distribution of benefits, and 
the coverage area\
There are four main grouping under this classification: 1) Defined benefit 
schemes (DB)* ; 2) Defined contribution schemes (DC); 3) Private pension models; 4) 
Benefits-in-kind^
Defined benefit schemes grant pensions on the basis of each individual's 
history of covered earnings, irrespective of the payments that he or she may have 
made into the system. DB schemes are of three forms: 1) Employment Related 
Systems; 2) Universal Pension Systems; 3) Means Tested Systems.
Employment Related Systems includes pensions, family allowances and work 
injuries (on the existence of employment relationship itself). Such programs are 
financed entirely or largely from contributions (usually a percentage of earnings) by 
employers, workers, or both, and are in most instance compulsory for defined 
categories of workers and their employers. Such systems are referred to as social 
insurance systems.
Universal Pension Systems provides flat-rate cash benefits to residents or 
citizens, without consideration of income, employment or means, usually financed 
from general revenues. These benefits are often universal in application for persons 
with sufficient residency.
Most social security systems incorporating a universal program also have a 
second-tier earning-related program. Some universal programs are financed in part
’ The countries included in our empirical analysis posses some combination o f the systems. However, 
we did not use the type o f social security systems as a separate attribute in our empirical analysis.
* It is also named as Income Maintenance Program 
’ direct service or financing
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by contributions from workers and employers, even though they receive substantial 
support from income taxes.
Means-Tested System establishes eligibility for benefits by measuring 
individual or family resources against a standard usually based on subsistence needs. 
Benefits are limited to needy or low-income applicants. Such programs are variously 
referred to as social pension equalisation payments and it is financed from general 
revenues. It is administered by social insurance agencies.
Defined contribution schemes credit each participant with actual payments 
made into the system, much like an individual account. DC schemes are of three 
forms: 1) Mandatory Privates Insurance; 2) Provident Funds**; 3) Employer Liability.
Mandatory Private Insurance may have been put into place to substitute for or 
to complement social insurance systems. The employee (or a combination of 
employee and employer contributions) funds private insurance through mandatory 
contributions to an employee's individual account. The employee must pay an 
administrative fee for the account.
Public Provident Funds type of system exists primarily in developing 
countries and are essentially compulsory saving programs, in which their employers 
match regular contributions withheld from employee's wages. These contributions 
are set aside for each employee in a special fund for later repayment to the worker. 
When defined contingencies occur, although in a few cases the beneficiary can opt 
for a pension or pensions are provided for the survivors.
In E m p lo y er  L iab ility  S y stem  type, w orkers are u su a lly  protected  through  
labor codes whereby affected employers are required to provide specified payments
or services directly to their employees, such as payment of lump-sum gratuities to be
' National Provident Fund systems (like in Chile) is a type of this category.
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aged or disabled. This approach does not involve any direct pooling of risk, since the 
liability for payment is placed directly on each employer.
lII.l.B.Systems According To Financing Methods (Public Pension Schemes)
Social security systems according to financing methods are divided into three 
groups: 1) PAYG; 2) Fully Funded; 3) Partial Funded.
In Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme, benefits accruing to the current 
beneficiaries are financed by current contributors or budget transfers (generally in 
DB style) such as the programs in Germany, France, Italy, UK, USA, and Turkey.
In Fully Funded type, the contribution rate is chosen so as to accumulate a 
stock of capital that, any point in time should equal the present discounted value of 
future benefits minus future contributions of those currently in the scheme (generally 
in DC style).
Partially Funded type combines features of a fully funded and a PAYG 
scheme, however, reserves do not fully meet the aforementioned financial condition 
(generally in DB style). Examples of this system type are the schemes in United 
States, Japan, and Sweden®
DB is sometimes assumed to be synonymous with public PAYG schemes and 
DC plans are with private funded pension, but this is not strictly true. A DB plan may 
be funded or unfunded, but its degree of funding is inherently uncertain, as 
calculations of the present value of future liabilities depend of assumptions as the life 
expectancy of participants and the rate of return on assets of the plan. DC plans are 
always fully funded, but there is no compelling reason for this to be true.
' for earning related scheme only
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Another point that should be considered to make the distinction between 
these two schemes is that, DB/DC choice is central design of pension policies 
because DB invariably redistributes wealth within a single generation or cohort 
whereas DC generally does not.
III.2 Criteria for Evaluating Systems
Most of the defined social security systems today are publicly managed, 
"defined benefits" that depend on worker's earnings, and are financed by payroll 
taxes on a PAYG basis. This means that today's workers are taxed to pay the 
pensions of those who have already retired. As mentioned before, those systems 
create financial burden on the economy. Averting the Old Age Crisis, World Bank 
(1994) documents, in great detail, many problems found in that systems.
There are several problems that lead to the crisis of today's social security 
systems. The existing systems have not always protected the old; they especially will 
not protect those who grow old in the future; they often have not distributed their 
benefits in an equitable way; and they have hindered economic growth. We list 
below these problems.
1. High and rising payroll tax rates, which may increase unemployment
2. Evasion and escape to the informal sector, where workers may be less 
productive
3. Early retirement, which reduces the supply of experienced labor
4. Misallocation of public resources, as scarce tax revenues are used for 
pensions rather than for education, health or infrastructure
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5. Lost opportunity to increase long term saving, which are considered to be 
low in many countries
6. Failure to redistribute to low income groups
7. Unintended inter-generational transfers (often to high income groups)
8. The growth of a large hidden implicit public pension debt, which, together 
with the abuses mentioned above, makes the current system financially non- 
sustainable in many countries.
In line of above problems, there is a great tendency towards the reform on 
social security systems. The social security system is a complex institution that plays 
many roles simultaneously. In some ways, it behaves like a (mandatory) savings 
program, like a saving account or a pension. Like these other instruments, it 
reallocates income over time, taking contributions during one's working years and 
then paying benefits during retirement. It is also an insurance program, since it 
replaces some of the income lost following the disability or death of a covered 
worker, and thereby cushions the household's decline in economic well being. 
Finally, the social security system is a very important income distribution program, 
like the income tax and transfer system.
Below are the list of criteria'“ to evaluate social security systems based on 
their ability to achieve their stated objectives through their specified programs.
1. Income adequacy: Are benefits sufficient for recipients to maintain minimum 
standard of living?
2. Individual equity: What is the relationship between what an individual 
contributes to the system and what an individual can expect to receive in return?
' proposed by the 1994-1996 Advisory Council's Technical Panel on Trends and Issues, US
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3. Economie growth
3.1. Individual labor-leisure choice: Is there a distortionary effect 
on labor market?
3.2. Individual consumption-saving choice through aggregate national saving: 
Is there an effect on the allocation of income between consumption and 
saving.
4. Other considerations
4.1. Administrative cost
4.2. Confidence in the social security system: political and economic 
components
4.3. Social cohesiveness: Which type of systems affects which part of the 
society.
4.4. Financial health of the social security system
III.3.History of Transition from PAYG to Funded Systems
During 1980s, many industrial countries had experienced problems with 
PAYG financing method. Many studies were carried out, which state that there are 
two sources of financial strains that were experienced in these countries. One of these 
sources is the generous pension benefit. These costs are awarded at a point in time 
but paid from some later time in the future, and under PAYG, contribution rates are 
required to be higher during the period of employment. In addition, prospective 
population ageing reduced the ratio of number of workers to number of pensioners. 
Therefore, higher PAYG contribution rates are needed to pay the particular level of 
pension benefits. One way to finance the public pensions was funding. However,
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during 1980s, not much emphasis was put on analysing the pros and cons of 
changing the financing methods.
The switch to funded systems, receiving more attention, had become a major 
issue in the literature by mid-1990s. The discussion on the issue involved no 
significant argument as to the inherent superiority of the funded systems over PAYG. 
Moreover, not many faults have been found in the PAYG system, which many 
industrial countries have been using to scale back pensions. Indeed, there have been 
political incentives to make quite large adjustments in pensions such as in U.K. It has 
been shown that PAYG pensions can be sustainably financed (Chad and Jeager, 
1997). Probably, the most important factor that led to the increased attention toward 
funded systems is the success of the reform in Chile, which involved switching to 
this system. It has been claimed that the reform did not only put in place a lower- 
cost, more secure pension system, but also has been conducive to the country's 
subsequent impressive savings, investment and growth performance. By considering 
this, funded systems are now being implemented or considered for implementation in 
other countries in Latin America (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), as well as in 
some countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Poland), and of the Former Soviet 
Union (Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine).
III.4. Evaluation of Social Security Systems in the Sample Countries
X.X. Sala-i-Martin (1997) links public pensions to retirement. In the light of 
this study and the information provided by " Social Security Throughout the World", 
we prepared the following table (Table 1) to show the current systems and the 
properties of the retirement systems of the countries.
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TABLE IrSOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM FEATURES OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES
COUNTRY■
Argentina
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Canada
Chile
China
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
M auritus
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
Tunisia
Turkey
UK
USA
COVERAGE
, .O'
FINANCING TYPE SYSTEM TYPE
E.S N Y 60(M)55(W) Y I Y 1+5
E.S N Y 65(M)60(W) Y C Y PAYG 1
E.P Y Y 65(M)60(W) Y Y Y PAYG 1
Eiindustry, commerce 55(M)50(W) Y C Y 1+6
E.S N Y 65(M)65(W) Y Y N PAYG 2+1
E(vol),S Y 65(M)60(W) c C Y FULLY FUNDED 1+6
E Y Y 60(M)55(W) Y I Y PAYG 1+8
E N Y 67(M)67(W) D c Y P AY G .FU LLY  FUNDED 2+1
E Y Y 65(M)65(W) N c Y PAYG.PARTIAL FUNDED 2+9
E.P N 60(M)60(W) Y Y PAYG 1+5
E.S.P Y D 65(M)60(W) Y I Y PAYG 1
E.P.agriculture Y Y 65(M)60(W) Y Y PAYG 1
E Y D 60(M)60(W) Y I Y PAYG 1
E 66(M)66(W) N c Y PAYG 1+3
all.P Y 65(M)60(W) N I Y 1
E,P,S,farmers 60(M)55(W) Y c Y PAYG 1
E N Y 60(M)56(W) Y cov Y PARTIAL FUNDED 1
resident(firmsize>=10) 60(M)60(W) Y I Y 1
E, Y 55(M)55(W) C Y 7+1
LI residents, E.S(vol) 60(M)60(W) N N ■ 1+2
All residents N 65(M)65(W) N c FULLY FUNDED 1
all residents, E.S 67(M)67(W) . N cov Y 1+2
E.S Y 65(M)62(W) Y C Y 1
E.S.P Y 65(M)65(W) Y C Y PAYG 1
All residents N 65(M)62(W) Y Y PAYG 1+4
E Y 60(M)60(W) Y C Y PAYG 1
E 55(M)50(W) Y C Y PAYG 1
all residents, optional for E N Y 65{M)60(W) Y Y Y PAYG 1
E N Y 60(M)60(W) Y cov Y PARTIAL FUNDED 1
Notes:
I.A b b re v a t lo n s  fo r  sys tem  type : 2. E xp la n a tio ns  o f co lu m n s
1. Social Insurance system .fo r  covaraqe co lum n
2. Universal pension system E-employers or employed persons
3. Means tested system S-Self-employed persons
4. Mandatory occupational pension P-Public workers
5. Private social insurance (vol)-voluntary
6. Mandatory private insurance
7. Provident fund .fo r  c o lu m n  o f E
8. Em ployer provided plans D-incentIve for deferral of retirement or pension
9. S tatuory earnings related .fo r  c o lu m n  H:
C-related to years of contribution
Y-Yes l-related to years of insurance
N-No cov-related to years of covarage
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We examine our sample countries to investigate the relation between transfers and 
retirement. In most countries, the elderly are required not to earn any extra labor 
income so that they can receive old-age pensions. They should "effectively retire" to 
be a pensioner (column D). Various economic incentives are involved in the social 
security programs of many other countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, United 
Kingdom; see column E). One such incentive program has been experienced by the 
United States. In 1992 figures, marginal tax rates on labor income over $7440 for the 
retirees under 65 is 50 percentage and 30 percentage for the ones between 65 and 70. 
Many studies point out the social security programs themselves led to such an 
outcome (see column F).
As indicated in the table, pensions are linked to previous wages. In most of 
the sample countries, pension is determined fully or partially by the worker's 
previous wage earnings. Either the benefits are simply proportional to contributions 
or there are other factors as in Canada, Denmark that may incorporate a basic pension 
scheme, yielding a minimum amount of income for all the elderly, or the pension 
benefits are directly related to the history of previous wage earnings.
As seen in the table, pensions are linked to work history. For the sample 
countries people are to work for a certain number of years and to make contribution 
during this period so as to get the right to collect pensions (column H). The minimum 
number of years to work that is required being a full pensioner vary from 3 years in 
Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom to 40 years in Belgium.
As seen in Column I, in most of the countries, the social security system is 
financed with wage taxes. The worker generally pays a fraction, and the employer 
pays the rest, although in some countries the government pays a final fraction or 
becomes the third payer.
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Labor Productivity
Size of Labor Force
FINAL DEMAND
Population ageinq AGGREGATE SAVINGS Economic growth
Source: Schulz, Borowski, Crown, 1001
FIG U R E 1
PO PULATIO N AGEING  AND M A C R O EC O N O M IC  IN D ICATOR S
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III. 5. Effects of the Systems on Macroeconomic Performance
Many countries have been experiencing population aging and therefore 
steadily increasing dependency ratios (see Appendix 2A), which resolve to various 
strains within the social security system of each particular country. As a result of the 
changes in the demographic structures, i.e. increasing life expectancies (see 
Appendix 2B), change in fertility (Appendix 2C) and mortality rates, the current 
systems, mainly PAYG, start facing financial problems which lead to increased 
social security deficit. In turn, the problems of the existing systems affect overall 
macroeconomic performance. As indicated in literature survey, a vast amount of 
literature exists, which investigates the relationship between different social security 
systems, saving rate and labor market dynamics. In addition to saving rate and labor 
market, we suggest other macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth rate, budget 
deficit and inflation to be considerably affected by social security attributes. In this 
section, we fonn a basis to evaluate the validity of the models described in Chapter
IV, and to interpret the results presented in Chapter V.
To illustrate the relationship between the macroeconomic indicators stated 
above and the social security attributes, we have to understand the channels, which 
constitute the dynamics of this relation. Figure 1 presents an overview of these 
interrelations.
Governments finance income-related pensions predominantly through payroll 
taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis. With this type of financing, today's workers support 
today's retirees so there is no need to build up a pension fund. This is the great 
attraction of such schemes: full pensions can be given to a first generation of workers 
who retire before the plan matures, even though they did not contribute the social
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security in the early years of their working lives. Moreover, if the demographics and 
economics are right, these are the pensions, which can be proceeded at little or no 
cost to succeeding generations of workers. PAYG financing under these 
circumstances can be justified as enlightened self-interest with no need for emotional 
appeals to "solidarity" between generations and altruism of young workers toward 
their elders.
Feldstein (1980) argues that PAYG pensions may have adverse (positive) 
effect on saving. But economic theory cannot predict the effect on national saving of 
the introduction of unfunded pensions. Early participants in such plans enjoy a 
windfall gain, for they receive disproportionate benefits compared to what they 
contribute in taxes. This is known as the social security wealth effect, which causes 
the current consumption to rise, so is unambiguously negative for saving. There are 
two additional effects, which are positively related. First, access to a pension might 
induce workers to retire earlier then they otherwise would, and, unless the pensions 
are exceedingly generous, individuals will want to build up over fewer working years 
in order to supplement their social security income during retirement. This causes 
workers to increase their rate of saving. Second, individuals save not only for 
retirement but also to leave an inheritance for their children. Parents, realising that 
future generations bear the burden of their retirement benefits, may save more in 
order to leave larger bequest, thus offsetting the impact of social security taxes on 
their children's incomes. Barro (1974) argues that this bequest effect offsets 
completely the negative impact of social security wealth on national saving.
The alternative to PAYG is a funded system, which might be expected to 
have a positive effect on saving. When pensions are administered by governments, 
however, funding may well be more apparent than real. Even when accounts are kept
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'off budget', policy makers typically regard social security contributions as a part of 
general revenue: they promptly spend it or use the income to reduce the taxes, which 
causes the public debt to increase. It is a simple matter for a government or a central 
bank to finance new debt by selling bonds to the social security fund, the assets of 
which typically consists solely of government bonds. The government has to service 
its debt, so it remains committed to future transfer payments; the apparent funding 
amounts to little more than creative accounting, a round about method of PAYG 
financing.
Willmore (1998) argues some points about saving as follows:
"Private funds may increase saving, but they may have also no effect at all, and they might 
even decrease saving. If contributions to private pension funds are voluntary and taxed in the 
same manner as other saving, they will have no effect whatsoever on total saving; saving in 
pension funds will simply displace other forms of saving. If contributions to pension funds 
are sheltered from taxes, or are taxed only lightly, their effect on saving may well be 
negative."
For national saving to increase, someone's consumption must fall. The 
government can finance its pensions with taxes, for instance, consequently causing 
the general public to reduce consumption; or it can pay lower pensions, thereby 
causing retirees to reduce their consumption. But governments can achieve this same 
result with tighter fiscal policy or conventional public pension reform, eliminating 
the need to privatising social security systems.
In the discussion of the effect of social security systems on national saving, it 
is important to make a distinction between DB and DC schemes. It is more 
important to make this distinction than to make the ehoice between funding and 
PAYG or public and private provision. A DB plan grants pensions on the basis of
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each individual's history of covered earnings, irrespective of the payments that he or 
she may have made into the system. A DC plan, in contrast, credits each participant 
with actual payments made into the system, much like an individual account.
Presumably, the improvident behaviour, which justifies mandatory 
participation in social security in the first instance, is still present at retirement, so 
workers ought to receive a pension rather than a lump sum settlement. With defined 
benefits, the size of the pension is by definition part of the contract between a worker 
and the pension scheme. With defined contributions, the worker's accumulated 
savings have to be transformed into monthly annuity payments.
The demographic trends have placed enormous pressure on the financial 
viability of the social security systems of many countries. The financial pressure 
caused by demographic trends is compounded by another trend. In every country, 
employers are leaving the labor force at younger ages (see Appendices 2D and 2E). 
It is clear that, there is a strong correspondence between the age at which benefits ai'e 
available and departure from the labor force. Social security programs often provide 
generous retirement benefits at young ages due to different retirement age policies of 
pension systems. In addition, plan provisions often imply large financial penalties on 
labor earnings beyond the social security early retirement ages. Furthermore, in many 
countries, disability and unemployment programs effectively provide early- 
retirement benefits before the official social security early-retirement age. The 
conclusion is that social security program provisions have indeed contributed to the 
decline in the labor force participation of older persons, reducing the potential 
productive capacity of the labor force.
Particularly defined benefit plans and, most dramatically, PAYG pension 
systems face the problems that arise due to changes in demographic structure. The
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decline in labor force participation rate amplifies the problems of financing social 
security in times of population aging because it implies more beneficiaries and fewer 
contributors. As indicated by Gruber and Wise (1998), declining old age labor force 
is strongly correlated with the incentives created by generous early retirement 
provisions. Unlike defined contribution plans in funded pension systems, PAYG 
based systems show more unfair design due to its nature.
According to Peter J. Ferrara (1980)", social security system has three 
separate effects that tend to distort the labor supply, discourage employment, and 
create economic inefficiency. The first effect is caused by the payroll tax, which 
creates a wedge between what an employer pays and what an employee receives. 
This wedge is equal to the full amount of the social security tax, including both the 
employer and employee's shares, and is borne entirely by the employee. This wedge 
reduces the compensation of workers and therefore discourages them from working. 
With less employment, economic inefficiency and misallocation of resources, the 
result is lower GNP. Earning test causes the second effect. This test-applied in some 
European countries and USA- reduces benefits for all beneficiaries under the age of 
62 who have annual earnings above a certain limit. It works as a tax on earned 
income. This reduces the compensation of workers, so discourages employment 
among the elderly. The third effect is the result of the decreased capital supply, 
which is caused by the reduction in savings. The loss in capital investment by social 
security results in lower wages, lower worker productivity, less employment, lower 
GNP and more unemployment.
The above categorisation, in fact, gives a brief description of the overall effect 
of social security systems. In addition to this, another important factor is that the 
existence of Unemployment Insurance. There has been large number of studies
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investigating the impact of unemployment insurance on the unemployment rate. 
These studies reflect not only differences in approach (cross-sectional or time series), 
but also differences in the way the effect is measured. Some measure the effect of 
absolute changes in the replacement ratio (see Appendix 2F), others percentage 
changes and the results can be given in terms of elasticity. There are two studies'" 
for the United Kingdom and the United States. The results of these studies yield that 
Unemployment insurance has a significant but relatively small effect on 
unemployment rate.
There are nonetheless important differences between pure PAYG and funding 
with government debt. First, participants in a funded scheme earn only the return that 
assets of the pension fund earn, so the first generation does not receive a windfall 
gain on their contributions to social security. They do, however, receive a windfall 
gain in the form of lower taxes and increase in government spending for social 
security finance. Second, funding leaves a transparent burden on future generations, 
since the debt is explicit rather than the implicit debt of unfunded pension liabilities. 
Third, if real interest rates are higher than real GDP growth, social security 
contributions will be insuffieient to finance pension payments to retirees. In this 
case, funding with government debt will be equivalent to mature of PAYG scheme 
only if the latter is financed partly from payroll taxes and partly from general taxes. 
If, on the other hand, real interest rates on government debt are low or negative, 
contributions to a social security fund may eventually be larger than payments to 
retirees. Because governments are prone to spend the revenues they collect, those 
who favour the funding of pensions also advocate privatization.
" pp.104-105
'■ Schulz, Barowski, and Crown, PP.158-159
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Since there is an apparent relation between government financial position and 
the social security systems, we incorporate several attributes of social security 
systems in a model for deficit in the following chapter. Financial position of the 
existing social security system creates an increasing burden on the budget and also 
the future generations. Since contribution rates of insured person and employer are 
not changed due to the structure of the current system (such as PAYG), government 
has to take more financial responsibility. Furthermore, some features of the systems 
such as the existence of unemployment insurance becomes an extra budget deficit 
item.
In a country like Turkey, high rates of inflation may be one of the main 
characteristics of the economy for extended periods of time. Considering the main 
goals of social security systems, equity and adequacy, the effects of high rates of 
inflation on the social security system cannot be ignored. Inflation affects the 
purchasing power of pensioners, contributions of them through the system, and 
decision of employers for labor demand, since in most of the countries employers are 
required to pay premiums for their workers. In addition, high inflation decreases the 
real value of the accumulated contributions (or funds). We examine whether there 
exists a relation in reverse direction: do social security attributes have an effect on 
inflation? For instance, low retirement age in case of increasing life expectancy 
extends the time period for pension payment. Following that, higher financial burden 
occurs which may be a driving force for even higher inflation.
Changes in saving propensities, government spending, and labor supply have 
implications for relative prices, real interest rate, and real exchange rates; these 
variables in turn feed back onto decisions to spend and produce, therefore change the 
level of national output. The fact that transition from PAYG towards funded system
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leads to higher capital accumulation supports the view of different social security 
systems having different impacts on macroeconomic performance; the higher the 
capital accumulation, the higher the level of resources available in the economy, thus 
the higher are the GDP growth rates. So, we propose that, together with other 
macroeconomic indicators, GDP growth rate is likely to be associated with the other 
social security attributes as well.
As described in detail above, the various attributes of social security systems 
have important effects on main macroeconomic indicators. In the following chapters, 
we build models for these indicators to empirically investigate their relations with 
such attributes.
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND MODELS
The main aim of this study is to investigate the relation between the various 
Social Security (SS) attributes and macroeconomic performance. Our empirical 
analysis involves models for five basic macroeconomic variables: GDP growth rate, 
inflation, consolidated budget deficit, unemployment rate and private saving rate. 
The selection of explanatory variables for each model follows the related literature, 
to which we add the SS attributes. We describe the variables and provide the sources 
of data in Section IV. 1, and in Section IV.2, we present the models used in our 
empirical analysis.
IV.l Variable Definitions and Sources
We use the following variables as the dependent variables in our empirical 
analysis. All the figures are taken from International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, IFS).
1.Private savings to GDP ratio (Spriv):
(investment + current account -  budget surplus) / GDP 
investment = gross fixed capital formation + change in stocks
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2. Budget deficit to GDP ratio (Def/GDP):
(Consolidated central government budget deficit)
3. Unemployment rate (U):
(Percentage of unemployed out of work force)
4. Inflation rate (Inf):
In the empirical analysis, we use a transformed version: D= Inf / (1+Inf)· This 
measure has one to one relationships to inflation, but eliminated huge variations 
across countries.
5. GDP growth rate (GDPgr):
Calculated by using real GDP figures taking base year as 1990 
{[(GDP at t+1) -  (GDP at t)]/(GDP at t)}*100
The following are the macroeconomic variables used as the explanatory 
variables in our models, though not all of them appear in all five models. All the 
figures are obtained from IPS of IMF.
1. Growth rate of real per capita GDP (grGDPpc):
Calculated by using real GDP and population figures
2. Real interest rate (rint):
[(l+i)/(l+Inf)]-l where i is the nominal interest rate
3. Domestic credit/GDP (domCR):
(Domestic credit claims on the private sector as a portion of GDP)
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4. Real per capita GDP (realGDPpc):
(Real GDP / population)*exchange rate
5. Population growth rate (popgr)
6. Exchange rate growth (Devalr)
Growth rate of domestic currency in terms of $
(Rate of Devaluation)
7. Money growth rate (moneygr):
(Sum of currency outside banks and demand deposits other than those of the central 
government, refer to Ml generally, given in line 34)
To determine the social security attributes for our analysis, we follow " Social 
Security Throughout the World " by ISSA- International Social Security Association 
(1997). Our sample consists of 29 countries as listed in Appendix 1. The sample size 
is limited by the availability of consistent data. Furthermore, some of the countries in 
our sample have many different pension schemes, and thus, different contribution 
rates and benefit style. To include those countries in our sample, we chose the 
scheme, which has the highest coverage of beneficiaries. The countries in which the 
schemes are not differentiated according to their coverage area are not included. As a 
result of this elimination procedure, sample size is limited to 29 countries.
Below, we present the social security attributes that are used in our analysis.
1. Dependency Ratio (depratio):
Ratio of dependent population (persons under 19 and over 65) to the working age 
population (persons between 19 and 65).
(Source: World Development Indicators)
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2. Existence of unemployment insurance (UI):
This variable is indexed as four groups according to size of the coverage of 
unemployed people.
0: no unemployment insurance 
1: labor code requires but not fully applied 
2: employed persons but with many exclusions 
3: employed persons
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
3. Government Behaviour Towards Social Security System (govtbeh): 
Government's financial contribution to the social security system. This indexation 
consists of four categories according to subsidising behaviour towards the system.
0: no contribution
1: regular subsidy
2: support for any deficit
3: variable subsidy and support for cost
In this grouping, variable subsidy is thought as a greater contribution to the system 
than others, because besides deficit compensation, further contribution may also be 
made.
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
4. Contribution rate of insured person (inscont):
Contribution rate (premiums) of insured person as a percentage of average earnings. 
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
5. Contribution rate of employer (empcont):
Contribution rate (premiums) of employer as a percentage of average earnings. 
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
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6. Effective retirement age for women (ERAw):
Effective retirement ages for women calculated by dividing retirement ages to life 
expectancies at birth.
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
7. Effective retirement age for men (ERAm):
Effective retirement ages for men calculated by dividing retirement ages to life 
expectancies at birth. Rather than using those retirement ages, effective retirement 
ages are more suitable to include in the analysis as pointed out by Yeldan (1998). 
(Source: Social Security Throughout the World, 1997)
8. Contribution/expenditure (contSS/expSS):
Ratio of amounts of contribution by employer and insured person for social security 
to public expenditure for social security.
(Source: Government Financial Statistics- GFS of IMF)
9. Social security deficit as a percentage of GDP (defSS/GDP):
Calculated as subtracting expenditure on social security system from social security 
contributions collected from employer and employees and dividing it by GDP. 
(Source: Government Financial Statistics- GFS if IMF)
10. Public expenditure on social security/ total public spending (pubSS/Tpub): 
Ratio of public spending on social security systems to total public spending.
(Source: Government Financial Statistics- GFS of IMF)
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IV.2. Models 
GDP Growth Rate
There are many studies on the determination of economic growth. Just to 
name a few, King and Levine (1993) present cross-country evidence for the relation 
between financial sector development and GDP growth rate. The study by Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) provide a framework for economic growth under the political and 
economic aspects. Furthermore, Barro (1991) investigates the demographic and 
financial determinants of growth rate of real per capita GDP across countries. In 
accordance with the results of these studies, we include variables 1 to 4 for our GDP 
growth model. Variables 5 to 11 are potentially relevant social security attributes, 
with which we extend the model.
• dependen t variable: GDP growth rate
• explanatory variables: 1 .private saving rate
2. budget deficit
3. inflation
4. real per capita GDP
5. government behaviour towards social security system
6. dummy variable for unemployment insurance 
coverage
7. Employer's contribution rate
8. Insured person's contribution rate
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9. public expenditure on social security as a portion of 
total public spending
10. dependency ratio
11 .ratio of contributions from employer and worker to 
public expenditure on social security
Private Saving Rate
There are basically two studies which lead us to stmcture the private saving 
rate model: First one is from Baillu and Reisen (1998) which points out the effects of 
different pension systems on aggregate saving rate. The second one is by Edwards 
(1995), and it examines the difference in the saving rates across countries. In the light 
of these studies, variables 1 to 5 are included to our model. The rest of the variables 
are the additional ones to introduce the social security attributes to our private saving 
rate analysis.
• dependen t variable: Private saving rate/GDP
• explanatory variables: 1 .dependency ratio
2. growth rate of percapita GDP
3. per capita income
4. real interest rate
5. domestic credit as a portion of GDP
6. government behaviour towards social security system
7. employer's contribution rate
8.insured person's contribution rate
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9. ratio of contributions from employer and worker to 
public expenditure on social security
10. dummy variable for existence of unemployment 
insurance
11. effective retirement age for man
12. effective retirement age for woman
13. public expenditure on social security as a portion of 
total public spending
Unemployment Rate
Although we have no previous study at hand predicting the determinants of 
unemployment rate, we hypothesise that social security systems affect labor market 
significantly. Thus, we determine the model for unemployment rate by considering 
the possible macroeconomic variables (1 to 4), and related social security attributes 
as follows.
• dependen t variable: unemployment rate
• explanatory variables: 1 .inflation
2.population growth rate 
S.real per capita income
4. per capita income growth rate
5. effective retirement age for men 
b.effective retirement age for women
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T.dummy variable for the existence unemployment 
insurance
8. government behaviour
9. public expenditure on social security as a portion of 
total public spending
lO.insured person's contribution rate 
11 .employer's contribution rate
Budget Deflcit
Our budget deficit model follows the guidance of some previous works. The study 
by Roubini (1991) highlights the economic and political determinants of budget 
deficit. Also, Alesina and Perotti (1995) provide a framework for the cross-country 
differences of budget deficits. By considering those studies, we include variables 1 to 
3 used in the model for budget defıcit'^ variables 4 to 12 are social security attributes 
that we hypothesise to affect this relation.
• dependen t variable: budget deficit/GDP
• explanatory variable: 1 .GDP growth rate
2.inflation
3. unemployment rate
4. dummy variable for existence of unemployment 
insurance
In this study, however, we do not include political variables due to difficulties in gathering this data, 
mainly due to time constraints.
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5.government behaviour towards social security system 
b.contribution rate of insured person
7. contribution rate of employer
8. effective retirement age for men
9. effective retirement age for women
10. public expenditure on social security as a portion of 
total public spending
11 .dependency ratio
12.ratio of contributions from employer and worker to 
public expenditure on social security.
Inflation
Many studies in the literature have suggested that inflation is highly 
correlated with budget deficit. Metin (1998) analyses the relationship between 
inflation and budget deficit for the Turkish economy. Furthermore, Rogerson and 
Rupert (1993), Abdullah and Hanna (1994), Azariadis and Smith (1996) examine the 
relation between inflation, output and money growth rate. Moreover, Metin (1995) 
examines the inflationary process of Turkish inflation. Ertel and Insel (1993) state the 
determinants of inflation. Those studies guide us to predict the variables 1 to 4. We 
add the rest of the variables to examine the impact of social security attributes.
• dependen t variable: inflation
• explanatory variables: 1 .money growth rate
2.exchange rate growth
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3. budget deficit
4. domestic credit as a portion of GDP
5. dummy variable for existence of unemployment 
insurance
6. government behaviour towards social security system 
y.public expenditure on social security as a portion of 
total public spending
S.social security deficit as a ratio of GDP
9. dependency ratio
10. ratio of contributions from employer and worker 
public expenditure on social security
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CHAPTER V
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND REGRESSION RESULTS
We use the methods of OLS, 2SLS, SUR and the OLS by using the principal 
components to estimate for all five models. Section V.l gives the description 
descriptions of estimation techniques and explains the reasoning behind the use of 
different techniques in the analysis. Section V.2 reports the estimation results using 
these techniques. We report the results of OLS technique in Section V.2.A. In 
Section V.2.B, we present Ramsey-reset test, White-Heteroskedasticity test, Chow 
test and outlier test for OLS results; Section V.2.C includes the results of 2SLS 
estimation. In Section V.2.D, SUR and OLS estimation by Principal Component 
method are presented.
V.l Description of the Techniques Employed in the Estimation of the
Models
In several of our models, it is possible that there is a two-way causality 
between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. Such a two-way 
causality would result in the error term being correlated with the dependent variable 
and the OLS estimates would then be biased and inconsistent. The problem is 
addressed by estimating the model using a 2SLS estimation procedure.
The seemingly unrelated regression method (SUR, also called multivariate 
regression or Zellner's method) applies to a system where each equation has an
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endogenous variable on the left hand side and only exogenous variables on the right 
hand side. As in the standard regression case, the disturbances are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. Each equation of this kind of a system 
could be estimated equation by equation. However, if the disturbances of the 
equations are correlated, the SUR estimator is more efficient, because it takes 
account of the entire matrix of correlations of all of the equations.
The SUR estimator minimises the determinant of the covariance matrix of the 
disturbances. Each iterations of SUR reestimates the parameters after transforming 
the equations to remove the correlation across the residuals. You can take one 
iteration or iterate to convergence. In our empirical analysis, SUR yields generally 
the same result with the OLS for all the models.
As the last approach, we perform OLS by Principal Component (PC) 
approach using SHAZAM computer package. Our models have too many right hand 
side variables, which possibly create degrees of freedom problem. Also, it is possible 
that, some linear or nonlinear combinations of right hand side variables can better 
explain the variations in the dependent variable. Thus, we suggest that including 
some combination of social security attributes can be more relevant than individual 
attributes themselves. Thus, we first, determine principal components from social 
security data included in the original models, and then use those variables are used as 
explanatory variables with other macroeconomic variables. SHAZAM gives four 
principal components (PC), but we use the first and second ones only for subsequent 
PCs generally account for much lower variation in the social security attributes.
Ramsey-Reset test is one of the tests for the model misspecification. This test 
is used for cross-section models as well as time-series model. By Ramsey-Reset test, 
the estimated value of the dependent variable is used as an explanatory variable in
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the model, along with some powers of itself. In addition, we use White- 
Heteroscedasticity test to check for heteroscedasticity. We observe however, that this 
method also yields the same results as in regressions without the heteroscedasticity 
correction except for the GDP growth rate model. Also, in order to check for possible 
breakpoints in our data, we apply Chow test. Furthermore, we apply outlier test by 
excluding one observed extreme observation from the analysis.
V.2. Regression Results
V.2.A Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimation
For each model, in addition to basic macroeconomic variables, we introduce 
social security variables one by one. Those estimation results are reported in 
Appendix 3. Tables 2 to 7, however report the estimation of the models outlined in 
Chapter IV. In what follows, we only describe the variables that appear significant in 
each model.
Budget Deficit
We use four alternative specifications for budget deficit model, differing from 
each other mainly by the use of unemployment rate as explanatory variable. As seen 
in the correlation matrix (see Appendix 4), there is a high and negative correlation 
between unemployment rate and dependency ratio. Thus, the first three of them do 
not include the unemployment rate for checking. The fourth one gives the best results 
with the highest R-square (0.83) and F-statistics. We exclude pubSS/Tpub and
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contSS/expSS one by one from the model through runl to run3. The following 
variables are observed as significant:
According to our results, GDP growth rate (GDPgr) has a negative relation 
with deficit. Intuitively, one can expect that the higher the GDP, the higher the net 
taxes which lowers the budget deficit. Generally, developed countries have relatively 
lower deficits as a portion of GDP, whereas poor countries have more inefficient tax 
systems and may be more prone to deficit. According to the national income identity, 
government spending leads to larger GDP, but the inverse relation is not necessarily 
true. If the GDP growth rate increases, more resources can be created to finance the 
deficit, thus deficit can be reduced so as to confirm our result.
Model shows that, pubSS/Tpub is associated with deficits negatively. Given 
that deficit = G+TR-T, public spending on social security (SS) and welfare is an item 
of TR. Spending on social security exhibits more stable behaviour according to other 
public spending items. As in most of the countries, especially in Europe, there is a 
strong tendency to lower the public spending items (through privatization), but this is 
not true for SS spending, as most systems are still government-run. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that, since in a considerably high-inflation environment, transfer 
payments are adjusted to inflation, the dynamic relation between SS spending and 
other spending items should be carefully examined. When we look at the five-year 
period time trends of pubSS/Tpub and other public spending, most of the countries 
show a stable behaviour (e.g. United States, Malaysia, S.Korea) in such a way that, 
there is no sharp increase or decrease in their social security spending in five-year 
period.
Our model shows that unemployment rate U is associated with deficit 
significantly and has a positive relation with it. A possible explanation for this is as
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follows: If the unemployment rate increases, there is a recessionary gap which means 
economy is under the potential output level, which may lead to expansionary policies 
and thus to deficit. Furthermore, if unemployment insurance exists in a country and 
this covers a large portion of public spending on SS, this may cause higher deficit, 
because high portion of the unemployment insurance is financed by government 
which means systems is not financed by the contributions of insured persons and 
employer. However, this kind of relation is most probably not seen in many 
countries. Another possible reason of this result is that, unemployment insurance 
generosity makes people to be out of labor force due to sociological factors. This 
point is also examined in recent studies, but it is not aligned with any economic 
theory.
An interesting result is the negative relation between effective retirement age 
for women (ERAw) and deficit. The effective retirement age for a man (ERAm), 
however not significant. By closely observing data, "ERAw" shows more variable 
behaviour than retirement age for man. This variation should be interpreted by 
considering sociological and cultural differences between countries. If the retirement 
age increases, pension payments are made for shorter period. This causes a reduction 
in public spending on social security. Furthermore, this result is highly related to the 
labor force participation of older people. Literature strongly argues that a decrease in 
the labor force participation rate due to lower effective retirement age of elderly 
people creates higher burden on deficit.
GDP Growth Rate
Due to possible multicollinearity among the social security attributes, we try 
different sets of right hand side variables and obtain three different model
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specifications numbered as runs 1 through 3 as reported in Table 3. The main 
difference is to introduce insured and employer's contribution rates as explanatory 
variables in the third run and the use of different combinations of pubSS/Tpub and 
contSS/expSS in the first two. All models yield significant effects of deficit and 
pubSS/Tpub. Furthermore, GDP growth rate model results are obtained by applying 
White heteroskedasticity correction'“*. Estimations lead to following results.
We obtain that high deficit Def/GDP brings low GDP growth rate. Here, the 
reason of high deficit should be examined. Deficit includes returnable and 
unretumable spending items such that spending for social security. Government 
spending has both "returnable" (public investment) and "unretumable" (spending for 
security, government worker spending and etc.) spending items whereas transfers are 
unretumable spending items. If the returnable part of spending has a large proportion, 
and deficit occurs due to this, it is expected to increase working areas and an increase 
in GDP. But if deficit is generated by unretumable items, this could lead to a 
significant reduction in GDP. As mentioned in the deficit model, social security 
public spending and the deficit of the current systems is a major component of the 
budget deficit, so, for our sample this result is not surprising. Furthermore, since 
benefits are adjusted to inflation, this causes an increase in deficit, thus a reduction in 
the GDP growth rate.
We find a negative relation between pubSS/Tpub and the GDP growth rate, 
which is also supported by the above result. If social security payments have a large 
proportion of the overall public spending, this leads to a reduction in GDP growth 
rate due to its unretumable fashion.
V.3.C. explains White-Heteroskedasticit test.
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Private Saving Rate
We estimate private saving rate with three different specifications reported in 
the Table 4 as runs 1 to 3. The difference between these models is the use of 
"pubSS/Tpub" and "contSS/expSS" variables, since there is a strong relation between 
those variables, these two variables should be used separately (see Appendix 4 for 
correlation matrix). In the third run, we add both of them as explanatory variables, 
but none of them becomes significant. But if we add them separately as in the run 1 
and run 2, both of them become significant. As an alternative specification, which is 
not reported here due to low R-square (0,24) and F-statistics, the variable 
"pubSS/Tpub" is significant and has negative sign. This result gives a support for the 
notion that reforms, which replace government run SS systems by privately-run 
capitalisation systems will tend to result in higher private saving rates. The variables 
that appear significant are as follows:
The coefficient of domestic credit — claims on private sector- domCR was 
significant and has positive sign in our analysis. Overall, this result does not provide 
borrowing constraints have resulted in lower savings. There are several possible 
explanations for this result. The first one is that the share of private credit is a very 
(poor) proxy for borrowing constraint, and that this operates on households saving, 
and not on private savings. But, more adequate measures of barrowing constraints, 
such as the down-payment required to buy a house, which is not available for this 
sample, could give a reasonable sign (negative).
Our analysis gives a negative sign between real per capita growth rate 
(realGDPpc) and private saving rate. The literature argues that, in a life-cycle 
setting, income growth will have an important positive effect on private savings. This 
is largely the result of an aggregation across households. If an economy is growing.
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workers' saving will increase relative to retirees' dissaving and thus, measured 
savings will increase. However, as Basworth (1993) has pointed, there will also be an 
effect moving in opposite direction. In a growing economy, workers will tend to 
increase present consumption and reduce savings. We examine the consumption and 
saving data in order to see this type of behaviour and we obtain that some countries 
such as Italy, Israel, Denmark show this type of trend.
According to the life-cycle hypothesis, a country with a relatively high 
proportion of dependants (i.e. inactive young and old) relative to working population 
(Depratio), which means each working person should finance more inactive people, 
population experiences lower saving rates. Our model supports this. As indicated in 
most of the earlier studies, differences in demographics indeed play a key role in 
explaining differences in saving rates.
We observe that, if the system is financed mostly by contribution of employer 
and insured person contributions (ContSS/expSS), this affects private saving rates 
negatively. Due to this reason, many countries try to implement funding systems also 
to create new saving tools under the social security system, for which the response of 
private saving will not be as in government-run social security systems (PAYG).
The estimation results show a positive relation between pubSS/Tpub and 
private saving rate. If pubSS/Tpub increases, which means contribution of employer 
and insured person becomes less than benefits, this leads to an increase in the private 
saving rate. Furthermore, if the spending on the system increases, people have less 
trust in the system, which means that they try to guarantee their future incomes by 
alternative saving tools. By the increase in public spending, public trust decreases, 
and this causes further increase in deficit. Through this process, current govemment-
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run system looses the role of guaranteeing future benefits. Transition towards the 
reform usually starts due to continuous accumulation of deficit.
Unemployment Rate
We have two model specifications for unemployment rate indicated as run 1 
we report in Table 5. According to our model, deficit, real per capita income (at %95 
level of confidence), per capita income growth rate and effective retirement age for 
women (at %90 level of confidence), and public spending on social security is 
significant.
Our finding suggest that the income (realGDPpc) is negatively related with 
unemployment rate. It is logical that, less developed countries are faced with higher 
unemployment rate.
We observe a positive relation between percapita income growth rate and 
unemployment. Data is examined to search for the reason of this positive relation 
between income growth rate (grGDPpc) and unemployment. We see that among 29 
countries, 9 of them show relatively lower unemployment rate and growth rate with 
respect to whole sample. It is probably due to those observations that our data does 
not support the theory behind the growth and unemployment, which would normally 
indicate a negative association. We look at the descriptive statistics, and we see that 
there is negative correlation between real per capita income and growth. Thus, this 
different signed relation between income growth rate, rather than percapita income, 
and unemployment rate is obtained.
There is a positive relation between pubSS/Tpub and unemployment rate. If 
social security expenditures by public have large proportion, again this can have two
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components, high spending on social security or low spending on other items. As in 
the deficit model, the reasoning between deficit and unemployment is also valid here.
If the effective retirement ages for working people increase, labor force of 
elderly people increase for both men and women. In our analysis, the variable for 
women (ERAw) becomes significant and has positive sign. If publicly or privately 
new investments are not established, these lead to unavailability of working 
positions, and thus increase in unemployment with population growth. The 
interpretation associated with negative relation between "ERAw" and unemployment 
rate should therefore be based on the changing demographic factors. These changes 
result in the change of the relationships between unemployment and demographic 
factors. In light of the system analysis part and the literature survey, the obtained 
result can be considered as meaningful.
Inflation
For the inflation model, there are three main model specifications. Each group 
consists of three different runs. In addition to first group's variables -runs 1 through 
3, the second one includes dependency ratio- runs 4 through 6, and the third one has 
dependency ratio, "UI" and "govtbeh" variables -runs 7 through 9. Each group is 
differentiated according to use of defSS/GDP, pubSS/Tpub and contSS/expSS 
variables. All of the inflation models give high R-squares (0,96) and F-statistics. The 
results are given in Table 6.
Money growth (moneygr) plays a special role in determining inflation not 
because money affects prices more directly than other factors do, but because 
variations in money growth account for most of the variation in aggregate demand. 
Hence, the higher the money growth, the higher is the inflation rate.
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Our results show a positive relation between rate of devaluation (Devalr) and 
inflation. It is clear that the higher the rate of devaluation leads to higher import price 
and domestic prices.
Instead of the public sector, domestic credit claims on the private sector 
(domCR) could be a sign of effective allocation of resources provided that the 
private sector is profitable. In this case, we would expect a negative relation between 
inflation and domestic credit as a portion of GDP. Our result confirms this intuition.
Our results suggest that the higher deficit of Social Security system as a 
portion of GDP, deiSS/GDP, the higher the inflation rate. When we consider the 
deficit of the Social Security system as a component of overall budget deficit, a 
higher financial strain on the budget most probably leads to a higher inflation rate.
As mentioned before, public social security spending item (pubSS/Tpub) 
can be named as transfer payments, which are unretumable items as opposed to other 
public spendings, such as investment. Thus spending on social security could not be 
considered as a spending item inducing growth. As indicated in the literature survey, 
most of the countries are prone to higher burden due to lower contributions from 
employers and workers which increases the financial supporting responsibility of 
government. Thus, it is reasonable that higher public spending on social security will 
lead to higher inflation.
We expect that the ratio of contribution by both employer and insured person 
to public spending on social security, ContSS/expSS, should behave in the opposite 
direction of the previous variable ,pubSS/Tpub. If the ContSS/expSS is higher for a 
country, it is clear that the government’s financial support for the system is less than 
the other contributors. Such a relation appears to lead to a lower inflation rate
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Our result shows a negative sign for the relation between Depratio and 
inflation. Our sample consists of countries with inflation rates that have a large 
variety. We overcome this problem by taking the tranformation of inflation. As 
opposed to this, dependency ratios do not show a large variety. Furthermore, it is 
kown that, most of the countries face the problem of high dependency ratio whether 
developed or developing. Thus, the relation between this variable and inflation rate 
could have either positive or negative sign. However this relation is only marginally 
significant.
Government behaviour towards social security system Govtbeh is indexed 
according to country's financial support to the system, where the higher is the index, 
the higher is the support. We obtain a negative relation between Govtbeh and 
inflation. This relation should be evaluated from two different points of view. First, it 
could be considered that a developed country, which overcomes its high inflation 
problem supports its social security system more than less developed countries. Thus, 
the negative relation is intuitive. Secondly, higher financial responsibility of 
government to the system creates a belief among the people so that they trust the 
system. This may decrease the leakage ratio of the working population from the 
system, which induces growth and results in lower inflation rates.
V.2.B. Tests of Model Specification
We apply Ramsey-Reset test to all models for model specification. This test 
controls the model specification errors. We then look at the F- and chi-square 
statistics to test the hypothesis that coefficients on the forecast vectors (the predicted
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values of dependent variables) are all zero. All the models, except for two of the 
model specifications of inflation, indicated as runs 2 and 3 in Table 6, pass this test.
Another test employed in our analysis is the White heteroskedasticity test 
which is applied to the residuals from least square regression. The powers and cross 
products of right hand variables are included in the model to obtain an augmented 
regression. This test is applied for model misspecification. The null hypothesis is that 
the errors are homoskedastic and independent of the regressors and that the linear 
specification of the model is correct. The statistics provides a test of the hypothesis 
that the coefficients of the variables in augmented regression are all zero. The output 
from the test is F-statistic and a statistic which will have an chi-square distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors and squared regressors in 
the test regression.
For the GDP growth rate model, the calculated F-statistic is 0.64 but the 
critical value is 2.01. So, according to this test, null hypothesis is rejected for this 
model and we conclude that there is heteroskedasticity in errors. Thus, GDP growth 
rate model is estimated by White Heteroskedasticity correction.
In order to test the breakpoint problem of our data, we apply Chow 
Breakpoint test. The main aim of this test is to see whether the coefficient vector is 
constant over the subsets of data. Since our data is not time series, to apply this test 
to our models, we first order the data according to each dependent variable. After 
this, by examining the data using graphs, we partition this data into two parts if there 
is a sharp difference observed in magnitude. Our application of Chow test to our 
models, therefore, unavoidably leads to sample selection bias.
As a second way, we examine the explanatory variables of the models, and 
choose two variables that we suspect to generate breakpoint. We then apply the
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Chow test to these models by indicating these variables. Comparing the F-statistic of 
each model to the critical values, we observe that our models do not have any 
breakpoint problem. We also applied Wald test on data partitions to look at 
parameter restrictions, and the results confirm that no breakpoint exists in our data 
set.
As seen in the data set given in Appendix IB, the data for inflation shows a 
great variety among the sample countries. Especially Turkey’s data seem to be an 
extreme observation. In order to overcome this problem, as indicated in Section IV. 1, 
we transform the inflation data. However, the great variation for inflation data among 
the countries still exists. Thus, to check whether this data is outlier or not, we apply 
an outlier test.
For this test, we estimate all the models twice, first with including Turkey and 
second by excluding Turkey. When we compare the results of each group, we see no 
difference between the significance of variables, coefficients or the test statistics. 
Thus, we conclude that, there is no outlier in our data set.
V.2.C. Two Stage Least Square Estimation (2SLS)
Below we report the results of the 2SLS analysis for each of the model 
explained above.
In budget deficit model, it is possible that there is a two-way causality 
between deficit and inflation. The problem is addressed by estimating the model for 
budget deficit, where money growth rate and exchange rate growth and all the other 
explanatory variables are employed as instruments for inflation in the first stage. As
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shown in Table 2, the results of the 2SLS estimation for the deficit model do not 
differ much from the OLS results.
Likewise, the saving rate, in the model for GDP growth rate, is instrumented 
by domestic credit and real interest rate variables. As compared to OLS results, 
insured person's contribution rate becomes significant in 2SLS. As seen in the Table 
3, run 3 for 2SLS, the sign of inscont also becomes positive. It is known that, social 
security system is mostly financed by insured person's and employer's contributions. 
As the contribution of insured person becomes higher, the burden on the public 
sector due to benefit payments becomes lower. So, it can be considered that, higher 
contributions help to reduce social security deficit, thus, it can lead to create more 
resources to increase the national output.
For the private saving rate model, there are theoretical arguments by Baillu 
and Reisen (1997), to justify the two-way causality between saving rate and income 
growth rate. So, income growth rate is instrumented by the population growth rate 
and the inflation rate. We see that, such an attempt do not improve our model. As 
shown in Table 4, some of the significant variables in OLS estimation are not 
significant in 2SLS results.
When we estimate the unemployment model by the 2SLS estimation 
technique, we instrument the inflation rate by money growth rate and exchange rate 
growth. However, the model does not improve in terms of R-square, F-statistics and 
the additional significant variable. Results can be seen in Table 5.
Inflation model is also estimated by the 2SLS method, where deficit is 
instrumented by GDP growth rate and private saving rate. As a result of the 
estimation, some variables such as exchange rate growth losses its significance in the
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explanation of variation in the inflation. Also, lower R-square and F-statistics are 
obtained. The results can be seen in Table 6.
V.2.D. Principal Components and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
Estimation
In addition to OLS and 2SLS, we also employ SUR and Principal 
Components analysis to estimate all five models. As a result of SUR method, in the 
budget deficit model, employer's contribution rate becomes significant, unlike in the 
OLS and 2SLS estimations. According to this analysis we find a positive relation 
between the employer's contribution rate and deficit for which the intuition is as 
follows. When the employer is forced to pay higher contribution for their workers, 
the leakage of the SS system usually becomes higher which means participation rate 
to the existing system is low (creating informal sector). For example, just 40 
percentage of the working population is under the coverage of the SS system in 
Turkey. The most important reason for this is the employers' action towards not to 
pay the required premiums. The existing leakage from the system and the informal 
sector could be a possible linkage of this variable with high budget deficit. The SUR 
estimation for the other models does not add to the list of any significant variable.
As the last method, we employ OLS estimation with principal components 
for each of the models. We only use the first two principal components obtained from 
each models' own social security variables. The other principal components generally 
account for much lower variation in the social security attributes. For the 
unemployment rate model, none of the principal components are significant. For the 
other models, however, first principal component's of each model is significant with
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higher F-statistics though lower R-squares are obtained for some of them. The 
economic variables obtained as significant from OLS estimation still protect their 
significance. The results for principal components and SUR estimation are reported 
in Table 7.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1980s, a considerable number of countries have been reforming their 
social security systems, especially experiencing a transition from unfunded to funded 
systems. This transition is mainly due to improvements in demographic factors, 
which have had two important consequences. First, the social security system causes 
a deterioration of the economy due to greater financial burden. Seeond, the structure 
of the social security systems starts being insufficient in carrying out its main goals 
such as individual equity and adequacy. The financing methods and benefit 
distribution schemes become incapable of competing with the changes in 
demographic factors, such as the increased dependency ratio and life expectancy.
The need for the social security reforms, and the experiences of the countries 
that have gone through such reform processes, have induced us to investigate the 
relationship between some major economic indicators and social security systems. 
This study analyzes the effects of social security attributes on macroeconomic 
performance. In this paper, we build models for five main macroeconomic indicators, 
GDP Growth Rate, Private Saving Rate, Budget Deficit, Unemployment Rate, and 
Inflation, with both relevant macroeconomic variables and social security attributes 
such as social security deficit, contribution rates, dependency ratio, retirement ages, 
public spending on social security, government behavior towards social security 
system, and the existence of unemployment insurance.
We perform a cross sectional analysis, using 29 countries’ data averaged over 
a five-year period, 1992-1997, and estimate the models by OLS, 2SLS, SUR, and 
Principal Component techniques. We apply Principal Component technique to
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relevant social security attributes of each model in order to eliminate the potential 
degrees of freedom problem due to number of right-hand side variables being 
considerably high.
Most of the significant variables for each model appear to be consistent with 
the theory, such as the Life Cycle Hypothesis, and also, they come about as 
intuitively expected. The results of all the estimation techniques are consistent among 
themselves, however, some variables show different behavior between the 2SLS and 
OLS results.
Some of the main findings of this study are as follows: Public spending on 
social security as a ratio of total public spending is negatively related to budget 
deficit. Increased social security spending of the government induces lower GDP 
growth rate. Besides, contribution rate of insured person appears to be in a 
significantly positive relation with the GDP growth as a result of the 2SLS 
estimation.
In the private saving rate model, the contribution by employer and insured 
person for social security as a ratio of public expenditure for social security has a 
negative effect. An interesting result comes from the unemployment rate model: 
effective retirement age of women is negatively related with unemployment, an 
anomaly which must be explored further. Also, public spending on social security, as 
an unretumable item of public spending, is positively associated with unemployment. 
This variable is also significant and has a positive relation with inflation. 
Dependency ratio and government’s accommodative behavior towards social security 
system are also significant in our inflation model analysis. Besides this, several of the 
macroeconomic variables that are suggested in the related literature are also 
significant for each of our models. In a separate experiment, we observe that, for
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every model, the first principal component of the social security attributes appears 
significant, except for the unemployment rate model.
In sum, the main contribution of this study is first to determine possible social 
security system indicators; to assemble a set of social security attributes, generating 
some of them. Moreover, we estimate the effects of those social security attributes on 
several macroeconomic indicators. The existing studies generally compare different 
types of social security systems instead of the individual attributes of social security 
systems. Moreover, existing studies address the effects of different social security 
systems on saving, growth and labor market only. This study is an attempt to close 
this gap.
The main finding of this study is that several of the social security attributes 
are significantly related with main macroeconomic indicators, and therefore with the 
overall macroeconomic performance. For further work, this study can be extended to 
include time-series dimensions for a panel data analysis. Moreover, the number of 
countries included in the analysis can be enlarged, as a result of which the sample 
size would allow the analysis to include other features of social security system such 
as the system type. This could facilitate the investigation the effects of different 
social security systems on the macroeconomic performance.
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TABLE 2:OLS AND 2SLS RESULTS FOR BUDGET DEFICIT MODEL
OLS 2SLS
explanatory var/ runi run2 run3 run4 runi run2 run3 run4
c 33.38 26.82 23.74 27.92 33.58 27.27 23.82 28.19
traninf 0.005 -0.008 0.03 -0.012 -0.008 -0.02 0.03 -0.02
GDPgr -0,87 r * ) -0,90 (***) -0,62 (**) -0,89 (***) -0,87 (***) -0,9 (***) -0,62 (**) -0,88 (**'*)
u 0,29 (*) 0,28 (**)
govtbeh 0.26 0.22 0.1 0.36 0.24 0.2 0.1 0.34
unelns -0.05 -0.25 -1.01 0.012 -0.13 -0.33 -1.03 -0.03
inscont 0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.1 0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.1
empcont 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.1 0.11 0.14 0.02
ERAm -1.62 5.022 -2.38 2.56 -0.004 6.74 -2.07 3.98
ERAw -34.17 n -29.11 -25.74 -33.73 -35,91 (*) -31.37 -26.18 -35.19
depratio -0.08 -0.87 6.01 0.22 -0.47 6.12
pubSS/Tpub -0,17 -0,12 r*) -0,20 (***) -0,17 (**) -0,13 (**) -0,20 (***)
ContSS/expSS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.031
R-square 0.75 0.73 0.63 0.83
Adi. R-square 0.52 0.49 0.35 0.58
F-stat. 3,6(*) 3,7Sr) 2,68(*) 6,01 n 3,59(*) 3,74(*) 2,67D 6,01 (*)
F-stat(SS vars) 2,07(*) 2,05n 1.23 3,12(*) 2,04(*) 2,02(*) 1.56 1.89
Note:
( ^ )  Significance level for 99% level of confidence 
(^) Significance level for 95% level of confidence 
(^ ) Significance level for 90% level of confidence
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T A B L E  3:O L S A N D  2SLS R E SU L T S FO R  G D P G R O W T H  R A T E  M O D E L
OLS 2SLS
explanatory var. run1 run2 run3 run1 run2 run3
c 5.52 7.67 5.73 -1 .33 2 .05 -1 .35
traninf 0 .029 0.01 0.02 0 .04 0 .02 0.04
Def/GDP -0 ,64 (***) -0 ,62  (***) -0 ,63  (***) -0 ,65  (**·) -0 ,63  (***) -0 ,63  (***)
Spriv 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 .16 0 .1 2 0 .15
realGDPpc -0 .07 -0 .67 -0 .07 -0 .07 -0 .06 0 .23
ciovtbeh 0.28 0.33 0.29 0.46 0 .48 0 .49
Ul 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.4 0.41 0.95
inscont 0.01 -0 ,0 0 9 (‘)
empcont -16.1 -13 .79
depratio 0.06 -0 .82 -0 .65 4 .46 2 .78 1.46
pubSS/Tpub -0 .07 -0,02(*) -0.07 -0 .05 -0,08(*) -0 ,16  D
ContSS/expSS -0 .05 0.01 -0.01 0.01
R-square 0.76 0.74 0.77
Adj.R-square 0.58 0.52 0.6
F-stat. 6,81 n 6,19(*) 4,67(*) 5,43(*) 5,47(*) 5,28n
F-stat(SS vars) 5,48(*) 5,22(*) 3,96D 4,32(*) 4,12(*) 4,5(*)
Note:
Significance level for 99% level of confidence 
(**) Significance level for 95% level of confidence 
(*) Significance level for 90% level of confidence
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T A B L E  4:O L S A N D  2SLS R E SU L T S FO R  PR IV A T E  SA V IN G  R A T E  M O D E L
OLS 2SLS
explanatory var. run1 run2 runs runi run2 runs
c 9 5 ,46  (*) 141,89 (*) 113,44 n 88 .22 145 94.23
rint -0 .23 0.06 -0.14 -0 .55 -0 .62 -0 .54
domCR 0 .10  0 0 ,08  (*) 0 ,09  n 0.11 0.1 0,11 0
grGDPpc -0 .35 -0.02 -0.25 -1 .06 -1 .75 -1.08
realGDPpc -4 ,02  (*) -5 ,02  (**) -4 ,52 (*) -5 .07 -8 .15 -5 ,07  O
govtbeh -0 .58 -0.88 -0 .69 -0 .42 -0 .59 -0 .45
Ul -0 .32 -0.34 -0.56 -0 .58 -0 .23 -0 .43
inscont 0.05 -0 .005 0.03 0.12 0 .13 0.11
empcont 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.25
ERAm -64 .75 -98 .29 -77 .93 -67 .74 -123 .66 -72 .79
ERAw 24 .02 -1.36 14.65 43 .28 38.7 41 .29
depratio -49 ,36  (*) -53,44 (**) -51 ,08  n -50 ,94  (*) -59 ,56  n -51 ,68  n
pubSS/Tpub 0 ,73  (*) 0.31 0 .98 0.11
ontSS/expSS -0 ,09 (*) -0 .05 -0.1 -0 .09
R-square 0.62 0.61 0.62
Adj.R-square 0.25 0.27 0.26
F-stat. 2,56(*) 2,51(*) 2,25(*) 2,44(*) 1.9 2,14(*)
F-stat(SS vars) 2,67D 2,63(*) 2,6(*) 2,55(*) 1.98 2.53(*)
Note:
(***) Significance level for 99% level of confidence 
(**) Significance level for 95% level of confidence 
(’') Significance level for 90% level of confidence
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TABLE 5:OLS AND 2SLS RESULTS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT MODEL
OLS 2SLS
explanatory var.
c 1.51 1.02
popgr -0.47 ■ -0.59
traninf 0.11 0.17
realGDPpc -0,31 (*) -0,31 (*)
grGDPpc 0,91 (*) 0,92 (*)
govtbeh -0.5 -0.47
Ul 0.59 0.8
inscont -0.32 -0.34
empcont -0.01 -0.03
ERAm -56.75 -65.01
ERAw 57,63 (*) 65,90 (*)
pubSS/Tpub 0,42 (***) 0,43 (***)
R-square 0.68
Adj. R-square 0.42
F-stat. 2,94(*) 2 ,96D
F-stat(SS vars) 3,13(*) 3,15(*)
Note:
(***) Significance level for 99% level of confidence 
(**) Significance level for 95% level of confidence 
(*) Significance level for 90% level of confidence
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TABLE 6:OLS AND 2SLS RESULTS FOR INFLATION MODEL
OLS
explanatory var. run l run2 TUn3 run4 runs runs run7 TUn8 run9
c ■. ■ , -0.19 -5.15 -1.8 8.32 6.98 9.89 10.8 13.5 11.66
Def/ODP 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.072 0.13 0.063 0.11 0.1
m oneygr 0,6 (***) 0,72 { - ) 0,64 r * ) 0,86 r * ) 0,95 (***) 0,79 C n 0,91 0.77 r * ) 4,29 C*‘)
Devair 0,36 (***) 0,29 D 0,34 D 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.15
domCR -0,11 -0,1 r * ) -0,11 r * ) -0,12 r * ) -0,11 r * ) -0,12 c n -0,12 -0,13 r * ) -0,13 r ‘)
govibeh -1,48 C n -1.38 O -1,42 O
Ui 0.05 -0.003 0.03
depratio -19.62 -21,88 O -18.28 -24,61 O -20.86 -22,8 O
defSS/gdp 0,68 r * ) 0.51 0.39 0,65 (*“ ) 0,62 r * ) 0.29
pubSS/Tpub 0,26 r * ) 0,15 r * ) 0,23 C“ ) 0,20 D 0,14 (“ ) 0,24 C n 0,17 0.27 r * ) 0,21 n
contSS/expSS -0,07 r * ) -0.024 -0.034 -0,07 P * ) -0,07 r * ) -0.04
R>square 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Adj.R-square 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
F-stat. 7 3 ,9 5 (^ ) 6 9 ,5 7 (^ ) 62,4 ( - * ) 59,36(*^) 6 7 (-* ) 6 8 ,3 4 (^ ) 65,29(***) 63, 58,28("^)
F-stat(SS vars) 9,34(*) 9,34(*) 6,08(*) 4 ,8 n 6,98(^) 7,3(*) 6,28(*) 6,06(*) 5,21 n
2SLS
explanatory var. runl run2 run3 run4 runs runs run? run8 run9
c -3.49 -9.62 -4.91 9.99 8.8 10.89 12.41 14.35 13.24
Def/GDP 0.61 0.57 0.59 -0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.04
moneygr 0,66 r * ) 0,81 r * ) 0,69 r * ) 0,85 r * ) 0,92 r * ) 0,78 C n 0,89 C O 0,76 r ^ ) 0,84 C**)
Devair 0.3 0.21 0.28 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.22 0.17
domCR -0.1 c n -0,1 c n -0,1 ( n -0,12 r * ) -0,12 C O -0,12 C O -0,13 C O -0,13 C O -0,13 C O
govtbeh -1,47 C) -1.38 n -1,43 C)
UI 0.14 0.04 0.13
depratlo -20.48 -22,49 C) -18.77 -25,46 C) -21.45 -23,95 C)
defSS/gdp 0,78 c n 0.6 0.35 0,63 D 0,6 (O 0.25
pubSS/Tpub 0,28 r * ) 0.17 n 0,26 (“ ) 0,19 0 0,13 C) 0,23 0^·) 0 ,1 6 ( 0 0,26 r ^ ) 0.20 C)
ContSS/expSS -0,086 r * ) -0.02 -0.035 -0,07 D -0,07 n -0.04
F-stat. 68,18(*^) 63,34(*^) 57,92(^1 68,53(— ) 66,15(*^) 63,12(*^) 6 4 ,4 2 (^ ) 63,52(*^) 57 ,0 9 (^ )
F-stat(SS vars) 9,32(*) 9,46(*) 6,1 n 4 J 5 n 6,76(*) 7 ,2 n 6,45(*) 6 ,5 4 0 5,21(")
Note:
(***) S ig n ifica n ce  level fo r  99% level o f con fid en ce  
(**) S ig n ifica n ce  level fo r  95% level o f con fid en ce  
(*) S ig n ifica n ce  level fo r  90% level o f con fid en ce
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TABLE7.SUR AND PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE MODELS
INFLATION S U R P R IN C IPA L C O M PO N EN T
exp lanatory  var. " 2 ■■"
c 1 5 ,0 8 n 6.58 n 7.92 n 6.28
Def/GDP -0.007 -0.37 -0.02
moneygr 0,87  r * ‘ ) 0.51 (**) 0 .55  (***) 0 ,53 (***)
Devair 0.14 0,40(**) 0 .42 (**) 0 .43 n
domCR -0,13 r * ) -0,09 (***) -0.07(**) -0,087 (**·)
govtbeh -1.5 (***)
prlncl 0.44(*) 0 ,49 n
pr!nc2 0.34 0.4
Ul 0.14
inscont 0.03
empcont -0.05
deprado -26,89 (***)
detSS/gdp 0.25
pubSS/Tpub 0,19  r * )
ContSS/expSS -0.05
R 'square 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.94
F>8tat. 55.1528 46.07 48.2
PRIV.SAVING SUR PRIN C IPA L C O M PO N EN T
exp lanatory var. 1 2 3
c 45.78 (*·*) 21,76(***) 20,18 r * ) 21,37 r * ‘ )
rint -0.4 -0.77 -0.51 -0.08
domCR 0.11 r * ) o . i 3 n 0.08 0 .1 2 D
grGDPpc 0.05 -0.36 0.5 -0.4
realGDPpc -0.18 -0.29 -0.11 -0.27
govtbeh 1.47
Ui -0.26
prlncl -0.71 n -0.74 n
prlnc2 -0.21 -0.29
Inscont -0.0007
empcont 0,38  (**)
BRAm -28.12
ERAw 20.69
depratio -42,61 (·**)
pubSS/Tpub -0.26
ContSS/expSS -0.13 n
R-square 0.54 0.33 0.23 0.36
F-stat. 2.34 1.26 1.87
U N E M PLO Y M EN T SUR P R IN C IPA L C O M PO N EN T
explanaito iVVar. 1 2 3
c -29.25 -0.1 2.34 -0.24
popgr 1.2 0.23 0.19 0.37
traninf 0.01 0.02 0.022
realGDPpc 0.8 1.61 1.23 1.59
grGDPpc -0.17 0.67 0.29 0.7
prlncl 0.2 0.22
prlnc2 0.069 0.098
Ul -0.63
Inscont 0.013
empcont 0,34 (***)
BRAm 35.32
BRAw 0.23
pubSS/Tpub 0.15
R'Square 0.32 0.29 0.31
F-stat. 1.83 1.41 1.31
GDP G ROW TH SUR PR IN C IPA L C O M PO N EN T
exp lanatory  var. 1 2 3
c 5,29 n 3 .6 4 n 2.74 3.73
traninf 0,086(*) 0.081 0.07
Def/GDP -0,63 (***) -0,56 (·**) -0,62 (— )
Spriv 0.039 0.073 0.029
realGDPpc 0.52 0.056 0.48 0.35
govtbeh 0.46
Ul 0.81
prlncl -0,26 (**) -0,28 (·*)
prlnc2 - -0.062 -0.1
Inscont 0.14
empcont -0.047
pubSS/Tpub -0,14 r * )
ContSS/expSS -0.006
R -square 0.53 0.72 0.68 0.67
F-stat. 8.48 3.51 6.84
8 6
cont. TABLE 7
D E F IC IT S U R P R IN C IP A L  C O M P O N E N T (W IT H  U ) P R IN C IP A L  C O M P O N E N T ( W IT H O U T  U )
e x p la n a to ry  v a r . 1 2 3 1 2 3
c 25,18 r ) 2.07 0.4 2.23 5,06(**) 3 .970 5.23r*)
tranlnf 0.0890 0.08 0.084 0.09 0.083 0.08
GDPar -0,79 (* ·* ) -0.63 r**) -0.62 r**) -0.92 (*** ) •0.75 { - ) -0,94 (***)
U 0 .200 0.26(**) 0.210
govtbeh 0.22
Ui -0.27
princi -0,25 n -0.27 n -0,29 D -0.3 n
prlnc2 -0.01 -0.07 0.009 - 0.06
inscont 0.09
empcont 0,12 r )
ERAm 9.59
ERAw -0,34 r**)
depratlo -5.34
pubSS/Tpub -0,13 m
ContSS/expSS 0.02
R 'S q u a re 0.71 0 .6 5 0 .5 2 0 .6 4 0 .5 8 0 .4 0 .5 6
F -s ta t. 8 .6 5 4 .6 6 .0 6 8 .4 2 3 .8 5 .5 5
N o te :
P ’*) S ig n ific a n c e  le v e l fo r  9 9 %  le v e l o f  c o n fid e n c e  
P )  S ig n ific a n c e  le v e l fo r  9 5 %  le v e l o f  c o n fid e n c e  
n  S ig n ific a n c e  le v e l fo r  9 0 %  le v e l o f  c o n fid e n c e
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APPENDIX lA
COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
1 Argentina
2 Austria
3 Belgium
4 Bolivia
5 Canada
6 Chile
7 China
8 Denmark
9 Finland
10 France
11 Germany
12 Greece
13 Hungary
14 Ireland
15 Israel
16 Italy
17 Japan
18 Korea
19 Malaysia
20 Mauritus
21 Netherlands
22 Norway
23 Portugal ■
24 Spain
25 Switzerland
26 Tunisia
27 Turkey
28 UK
29 USA
8 8
C O U N TR y Def/GOP domCR irint ^'reail^>Ppc -
, MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS 
’^ grOOPpc Spriv ■ GOPgr moneygr " Oevair popgr ! Inf tranlnf 0
Argentina 0.72 17.65 -2.96 5.27 4.05 16.62 5.45 19.87 0.80 1.33 30.77 23.53 11.98
Austria 4.75 96.61 -0.17 21.48 1.19 25.63 1.74 8.11 1.12 0.55 2.76 2.69 6.65
Belghim 5.05 77.41 2.53 19.75 1.19 27.83 1.54 4.84 1.19 0.35 2.27 2.22 13.20
Boflvia 2.04 44.70 8.24 0.78 1.47 13.08 3.03 25.75 6.63 2.42 11.03 9.94 4.46
Canada 4.13 61.24 3.69 20.60 1.31 19.24 2.57 0.23 3.25 1.25 2.08 2.04 10.23
Chile -2.14 52.63 3.90 2.95 6.67 15.30 8.34 20.36 3.22 1.56 11.69 10.63 6.10
China 0.93 92.97 -2.50 0.48 10.42 41.33 11.55 27.60 8.97 1.02 11.85 10.59 2.77
Denmark 1.96 33.69 2.60 27.78 2.50 22.49 2.03 5.01 0.69 0.42 2.02 1.98 10.42
Finland 10.13 65.62 2.49 25.54 1.98 25.30 2.41 3.57 5.26 0.43 1.82 1.79 16.22
France 5.08 69.96 2.16 21.46 0.96 21.70 1.44 3.18 0.60 0.45 2.04 2.00 11.60
Germany 1.92 104.96 2.04 22.08 1.10 23.74 2.07 8.11 1.11 2.56 3.00 2.91 10.58
Greece 12.34 20.69 4.50 6.28 0.23 20.07 0.33 15.83 7.25 0.43 11.90 10.64 9.77
Hungary 5.93 27.55 -1.22 2.86 0.52 21.87 0.20 14.39 16.63 -0.32 24.08 19.41 10.15
Ireland 0.64 64.13 -0.19 15.07 6.46 21.02 7.15 9.43 1.26 0.65 2.25 2.20 14.05
Israel 3.12 68.33 0.70 12.05 2.32 22.48 5.15 19.07 7.24 2.77 12.08 10.78 6.38
Italy 7.69 59.67 1.96 19.75 0.89 26.15 1.12 5.58 5.94 0.22 4.44 4.25 11.55
Japan 0.61 116.89 0.56 25.47 0.42 33.89 0.66 7.74 -1.23 0.23 1.24 1.23 2.93
Korea 0.08 62.57 1.82 7.37 5.75 34.70 6.82 8.83 4.65 1.01 5.77 5.45 2.37
Malaysia -0.95 84.63 2.76 2.94 5.54 33.65 8.52 20.15 0.56 2.83 3.96 3.83 2.90
Mauritus 1.69 44.70 3.37 2.88 3.29 28.14 5.01 8.16 4.87 1.69 6.99 6.53 7.80
Netherlands 1.88 97.38 1.04 19.89 1.75 26.95 2.34 5.27 1.10 0.56 2.55 2.49 6.42
Norway 1.44 58.17 3.91 30.41 3.45 27.70 4.04 8.78 1.79 0.58 2.25 2.20 5.20
Portugal 4.27 70.74 3.59 7.44 2.25 27.79 2.13 10.76 3.76 -0.12 5.92 5.59 6.33
Spain 4.80 80.29 3.23 13.22 1.57 24.68 1.74 6.03 6.39 0.17 4.48 4.28 21.87
Switzerland 1.38 166.50 0.94 33.21 0.72 30.11 0.36 0.39 0.68 0.70 2.45 2.39 4.30
Tunisia 2.80 52.61 4.19 1.65 2.92 24.05 4.66 9.53 3.32 5.04 5.19 4.93 7.19
Turkey 5.41 18.57 -3.17 2.85 3.26 26.23 5.11 80.04 85.51 1.79 80.37 44.56 7.15
UK 5.47 117.04 1.66 17.39 2.25 19.73 2.36 7.91 1.49 0.11 3.24 3.13 6.53
USA 2.47 64.36 1.98 23.66 2.03 4.16 3.03 4.24 0.00 0.98 2.99 2.90 6.07
COUNTRY ContSS/ezpSS Inscont empcont
SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES  ^
depratie govtbeh Ul ERAm ERAw pubSS/TpUb defSS/GDP
Argel^lna 93.48 11.00 16.00 0.52 1 3 0.91 0.75 45.84 0.32
Austria 75.70 10.25 12.55 0.50 2 2 0.80 0.75 45.15 4.68
Belgium 80.00 7.50 8.86 0.54 1 3 0.89 0.76 42.30 5.75
Bnlivta 50.89 2.00 1.85 0.80 3 3 0.93 0.79 15.70 1.68
Canada 36.79 3.00 3.00 0.62 3 2 0.86 0.79 39.55 6.23
Chile 23.39 18.84 0.00 0.60 3 3 0.90 0.77 33.65 5.42
China 60.00 3.00 20.00 0.50 3 2 0.88 0.77 0.07 0.00
Denitfiarlc 9.21 3.00 7.00 0.52 3 2 0.92 0.86 39.30 14.66
Finland 14.62 15.00 3.00 0.48 3 2 0.89 0.60 44.39 14.46
Franca 88.42 6.60 9.80 0.54 3 3 0.88 0.73 44.45 1.61
Germany 105.68 10.15 10.15 0.46 1 2 0.06 0.75 46.10 1.20
Greece 2.02 6.67 13.33 0.51 1 2 0.87 0.74 14.24 6.12
Hungary 103.52 6.00 24.50 0.50 2 2 0.92 0.75 28.56 0.40
Ireland 46.73 7.50 10.00 0.65 2 2 0.88 0.82 27.48 5.91
Israel 23.99 3.00 6.00 0.60 1 3 0.87 0.76 23.12 8.09
Italy 65.02 9.00 19.36 0.46 3 2 0.81 0.75 36.57 3.61
Japan 66.41 9.00 9.00 0.44 3 2 0.84 0.78 37.55 2.84
Korea 59.20 2.00 4.00 0.40 3 0 0.87 0.79 0.90 0.52
Malaysia 15.94 11.00 12.00 0.70 0 2 0.79 0.74 5.44 1.21
Mauiltus 32.54 1.00 15.00 0.50 0 3 0.80 0.80 15.40 2,55
Netherlands 94.36 15.40 0.00 0.40 2 1 0.87 0.01 37.51 1.50
Norway 60.01 7.80 14.10 0.54 2 2 0.09 0.83 38.91 6.21
Portugal 87.37 11.00 23.75 0.58 1 2 0.90 0.82 25.07 1.47
Spain 86.50 4.70 23.60 0.47 2 2 0.89 0.80 38.61 1.60
Switzerland 97.12 4.20 4.20 0.47 1 2 0.87 0.76 49.93 0.30
Tunisia 91.31 3.00 4.00 0.60 1 2 0.87 0.85 14.12 0.99
Turkey 26.73 9.00 11.00 0.63 0 1 0.83 0.70 2.85 0.30
UK 46.04 7.00 7.00 0.51 0 2 0.80 0.75 28.73 5.67
USA 99.42 6.20 6.20 0.52 3 2 0.08 0.81 27.79 1.19
* Data are generated averaging 5-year period through 1992 to 1997
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APPENDIX 2A/1:ELDERLY DEPENDENCY RATIO*
1960 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxemburg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom 
United States
13.9 16 16.7 18.6 25.1 33
18.6 22.4 23.3 27.7 32.6 44
18.5 22.4 25.1 25.6 31.9 41.1
13 16.7 18.2 20.4 28.4 39.1
16.5 22.7 21.6 24.9 31.7 37.7
11.7 19.7 21.5 24.3 34.7 41.1
18.8 20.8 23.6 24.6 32.3 39.1
16 21.7 23.8 30.3 35.4 49.2
12.3 21.2 25.5 28.8 33.3 40.9
14.1 16.6 17.3 18.1 24.1 32.1
18.6 18.4 16.7 18 21.7 25.3
13.3 21.6 26.5 31.2 37.5 48.3
9.5 17.1 24.3 33 43 44.5
15.9 19.9 21.9 25.9 33.2 44.2
6.4 7 8 10.4 14.8
14.7 19.1 20.8 24.2 33.9 45.1
16.7 17.1 18.9 24.6 30.5
17.3 25.2 23.9 24 31.2 38.7
12.7 19.5 20.9 22 25.3 33.5
12.7 19.8 23.5 25.9 30.7 41
17.8 27.6 26.9 29.1 35.6 39.4
15.5 22 23.6 29.4 37.8 48.6
6.7 7.1 8.9 9.4 11.7 16.2
17.9 24 24.4 25.8 31.2 38.7
15.4 19.1 19 20.4 27.6 36.8
‘ Population aged 65 and over as a per cent of working age population 
Source: Bos et al., 1994
-----------Australia
Austria
.............Belgium
—  — - France 
Ireland
■ “  United States
1960 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
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APPENDIX 2A/2;TOTAL DEPENDENCY RATIO*
1960 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxemburg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom 
United States
63.2 48.9 48 47.6 53.7 62.6
52.1 48.2 49.3 51.3 56.7 71.4
55 49.2 50.9 49.3 57 68.9
70.5 47.5 48.3 47.5 56.3 69
55.8 47.9 49.1 51.3 57.9 67
60.6 48.4 49.2 50.4 62.7 70.9
61.3 51.1 52.8 51.2 59.6 67.9
47.4 45.3 46.7 50 57.3 75.1
52 49.6 48.8 51.7 57.1 66.3
75 55.2 52.4 49.5 54.7 63.2
70.6 61.4 49.8 51.3 52.6 54.5
47.9 45.5 47.8 51.5 58.8 72.7
56.6 43.5 47.2 56.7 67.8 70.5
47.4 44.8 48.4 50 58.5 72.7
71.6 61.5 50.2 45.5 48.1
63.9 44.5 47.7 47.5 58.1 73.2
50.9 51.9 50.2 54.7 61.6
58.2 54.4 54.1 51.7 58.6 68.3
59.1 50.7 46.4 46.6 50 59.8
55.1 49.3 45.3 46.9 52.7 64.8
51.8 55.3 57.9 58.5 65.1 70.4
51.5 46.1 49.6 53.7 62.4 77
81.4 66.3 57.9 46.9 46.1 48.6
53.7 52.9 54 52.3 58.3 68
67.4 51.7 52 50.5 57.4 68
*Population aged 0-14 and 65 and over as a per cent of working age population 
Source: Bos et al., 1994
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APPENDIX 2B:LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH
1990-1995 2025-2030
Australia 76.7 81
Austria 76.6 81.5
Belgium 75.6 79.6
Canada 77.8 82.2
Denmark 74.7 79.1
Finland 75.4 80.8
France 77.2 81.8
Germany 75.8 80.6
Greece 77.4 81.7
Iceland 78.2 81.9
Ireland 75.2 80.6
Italy 77.4 82
Japan 79.1 82.8
Luxemburg 75.7 80.6
Mexico 70.3 77
Netherlands 77.3 81.5
New Zealand 75.7 80.5
Norway 77.2 81.7
Portugal 73.7 78.3
Spain 76.8 81.2
Sweden 77.9 82.3
Switzerland 78.4 82.6
Turkey 67.3 74.8
United Kingdom 76.2 81
United States 76.6 81.8
Source: Bos et al., 1994.
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APPENDIX 2C:FERTILITY RATE*
1990-1995 2025-2030
Australia 1.9 2.1
Austria 1.6 2
Belgium 1.6 2
Canada 1.9 2.1
Denmark 1.8 2
Finland 1.9 2.1
France 1.8 2
Germany 1.3 2
Greece 1.4 2.1
Iceland 2.2 2
Ireland 2 2.1
Italy 1.3 2
Japan 1.5 2
Luxemburg 1.7 2
Mexico 3.2 2.1
Netherlands 1.6 2
New Zealand 2.1 2.1
Norway 1.9 2.1
Portugal 1.5 2
Spain 1.2 2
Sweden 2.1 2.1
Switzerland 1.7 2
Turkey 2.9 2.1
United Kingdom 1.8 2
United States 2.1 2.1
‘ Number of children per woman of childbearing age 
Source; Bos et al., 1994.
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APFJKJNJLUA Z U IE S IIM A IE S  U * 1 tlE .
AVERAGE AGE OF TRANSITION TO INACTIVITY AMONG OLDER WORKERS*
I960 1960
Males
1970 1980 1990 1995
66 66.1 65 62.7 62.4 61.8
66.4 63.9 62.7 60.1 58.7 58.6
64.8 63.3 62.6 61.1 58.3 57.6
66.7 66.2 65 63.8 62.8 62.3
67.1 66.7 66.3 64.5 63.3 62.7
66.8 65.1 62.7 60.1 59.6 59
66.1 64.5 63.5 61.3 59.6 59.2
65.7 65.2 65.3 62.2 60.3 60.5
68.2 66.5 65.6 64.9 62.3 62.3
68.9 68.8 . 66.7 69.3 68.9 69.5
68.3 68.1 67.5 66.2 64 63.4
66.9 64.5 62.6 61.6 60.9 60.6
66.7 67.2 67.7 67.2 66.5 66.5
65.8 63.7 62.5 59 57.6 58.4
66.4 66.1 63.8 61.4 59.3 58.8
64.8 65.1 64.7 62.9 62.2 62
67.6 67 66.5 66 64.6 63.8
67.8 67.5 67.2 64.7 63.9 63.6
68.1 67.9 65.2 63.4 61.6 61.4
66.8 66 65.3 64.6 63.9 63.3
67.7 67.3 66.7 65.5 64.8 64.6
69.1 68.7 68 64.9 63.5 63.6
67.2 66.2 65.4 .6 4 .6 63.2 62.7
66.9 66.5 65.4 64.2 64.1 63.6
Source: Leibfritz, Roseveare, Fore, and W urzel (1995)
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
56
54
-------------- ^   ^ ^
№  r ;  *
-----------Canada
Denmark
............. Germany
■ "  Japan
---------- Turkey
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APPENDIX 2E:ESTIMATES OF THE AVERAGE AGE OF TRANSITION TO INACTIVITY
AMONG OLDER WORKERS*
Females
P i
№  
S q iS
i 'i i'n n wUnitec
Unitel
im m
63.6 62.4 60.3 58.2 57.6 57.2
64.7 61.9 60.6 59.3 56.7 56.5
62.9 60.8 59.1 57.5 54.7 54.1
61.2 64.3 63 60.5 59.3 58.8
63 64.6 62 61 59.9 59.4
64.7 63.2 60.6 59.6 59.4 58.9
69 65.8 64 60.9 59 58.3
62.7 62.3 62.2 60.7 58.2 58.4
64.3 64.4 64.3 62.5 60.6 60.3
69.6 65.8 66.4 66
68.7 70.8 69.8 66 61.8 60.1
64 62 60.7 59.5 57.5 57.2
65.5 64.6 64.6 63.9 63.9 63.7
64.8 63.8 62.3 60.8 56 55.4
64.1 63.7 62.9 58.4 55.8 55.3
61.5 62.5 60.9 58.7 59.2 58.6
69 70.8 66.2 61.5 63 62
68.5 68.1 65.3 62.9 61 60.8
1
68.9 68 64.7 63.6 59.7 58.9
65.4 63.4 62.5 62 62.4 62.1
:
do
iS';
67.2 66.9 65.4 62.4 61.1 60.6
70.2 69.2 68.3 67.6 68.3 66.6
63.9 62.7 62.4 62 60.5 59.7
64.2 65.1 64.8 62.8 62.2 61.6
Source: Leibfritz, Roseveare, Fore, and W urzel (1995)
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
-----------Canada
^ ^ ^ “ Denmark
............. Germany
■ “  Japan
---------- Turkey
'United States
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
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APPENDIX 2F:EXPECTED OLD-AGE PENSION REPLACEMENT RATES*
j j  19.1 32.8 40.9
1  79.5 79.5 79.5
1  72.6 70.5 67.5
1 45.1 51.6
53.2
1 35.9 42.3 56.2
1 34.9 58.6 60
1 62.5 64.8
1 59.6 55
120
54.6
93
1 28.9 39.7
1 62 80
1 54.1 52.1
93.2
1 32.2 48 45.8
32 43 61.3
25.3 61.2 60
53.7
. 85 77 82.6
50 100
53.8 77.1 74.4
28.4 51.7 49.3
33.4 33.8 49.8
39.1 49.1 56
44 54.6 59.3
Source: Leibfritz, Roseveare, Fore, and W urzel (1995)
96
APPENDIX 3:INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ON BUDGET DEFICIT EQUATION WITH MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
O L S
e x p la n a to ry  v a r . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c 3.98 n 3.62 3.51 3.97 3 .8 5 0 7.04 10.36 3.75 2.09 7.93 ( n
tran in f 0.08 0,08 0.08 0.082 0.07 0.082 0.064 0.081 0.11 n 0.04
G D P gr ‘0.75 M .0,76 (***) -0,75 ( - · ) ^ .75(***) ^ .73  r * ) < 7 5  r^) < 7 3  {***) -0,76 r * ) -0,73 (***) -0,94 r * )
govtbeh 0.13
U l 0.15
inscont 0.001
em pcont 0.048
E R A m -3.32
E R A w -7.87
depratio 0.4
pubSS/Tpub -0.07
ContSS/expSS -0,036
r n
R -s q u a re 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.53 0.47
F -s ta t. 6.09 4.41 4.4 4.38 4.56 4.4 4.49 4.38 6.94 5.5
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INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ON GDP GROWTH RATE EQUATION WITH MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
O L S
explanatory var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
c 5.62 4 . 7 2 n 5 . 9 n 5 , 3 6 n 5.82 12.74 0.51 3J4 4,85(**^ ) 7 , 7 7 r * ) 1 7.76(-*)
tran in f d.0D1 0.0126 0.00016 0.001 0.005 0.0005 6.015 0.009 0.02 -0.0008 -0 .0 0 0 2
D ef/G D P -0,57(***) -0,57(*^ *) -0,56(*^ *) .0.57(-*) 0 , 5 6 ( n - 0 , 5 7 ( * n -0.54(*^ *) -0 .5 3 (* * * ) -0,62(* )^1 -0 ,6 (* * * )i -0.63(**")
Spriv 0.056 0.066 0.053 0.058 0.071 0.043 006 0.06 0.07 0.016 0.04
realG D Ppc - 0 , 1 3 n - o . i a n - o . i a n -0.13(*·) -0,13(’^ *) o , i 3 n - 0 , 1 2 n 0 . 1 2 n o . i s r * ) -0.05 - 0 , 1 1 0
govtbeh 0.34
U l ^.084
Inscont 0.03
em pcont -0.056
ERAm -7.67
ER A w 6.17
depratio 2.74
defSS/gdp 0 ,2 6 ( n
pubSS /Tpub O.07( )^
C ontSS/expSS - 0 ,0 2 r " )
R -s q u a re 0.6 0.62 0.6 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.7 0.66 0.71
F -s ta t. 9.35 7.67 7.18 7.27 7.67 7.35 7.3 7.28 11.01 9.23 11.51
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INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ON PRIVATE SAVING RATE EQUATION WITH MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
OLS
explanatory var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
c 22,08(*‘ ·) 22,ar*) 3 i,3 ir ·) 22,94(*·?) 16,05n 90,91 n 29,35 51,53(***) 22,39(**·) 25,61 (··*) 27.77r*)
rin t -0.64 -0.44 -0.33 -0.57 -0.2 -0.4 : -0.46 -0.15 ^.67 -0.6 -0.85
dom CR 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0,08(*) 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.092 0.088(*) 0.1
grGDPpc 0.41 0.54 0.23 0.47 0.62 0.38 0.49 0.18 0.26 0.11 -0.04
realGDPpc -1.31 -1.02 -1.76 -1.1 -0.85 -1.42 -1.15 -3.34n -2.01 0.74 -1.85
govtbeh -0.9
Ut -3.81
inscont -0.17
em pcont 0.31'
ERAm -77.02
ERAw -10.002
depratio -46.63
defSS/gdp 0.27
pubSS/Tpub -0.26
ontSS/expSS -0.07
R-square 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.22 0.36 0.22 0.32 0.29
F-stat. 1.6 1.35 2.23 1.3 1.87 2.06 1.23 2.62 1.31 2.17 1.94
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INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ON UNEMPLOYMENT EQUATION WITH
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
OLS
explanatory var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
c 6.35 6.44 1.25 5.99 3.88 -24.26 -11.24 3.99 7.3 -2.19 4.59
popgr -0.28 -0.29 -0.36 -0.24 0.16 0.07 -0.33 -0.42 -0.41 0.33 -0.19
traninf -0.02 -0.02 0.0007 -0.03 -0.02 -0.019 0.02 -0.031 -0.01 -0.017 -0.02
realGDPpc 0.026 0.026 0.06 0.021 0.072 0.059 0.025 0.03 -0.03 ^ .1 8 0.032
grG DPpc 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.023 0.05 0,12(*) -0.009 0.065 -0.15 0.66 0.15
govtbeh -0.048
Ul 1.87
inscont 0.061
em pcont 0.13
ERAm 33.38
ERA w 22.25
depratio 4,32
defSS/gdp 0.27
pubSS/Tpub 0,27(*^*)
contSS/expSS 0.016
R-square 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.26 0.29 0.3 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.54 0.27
F-stat. 1.62 1.29 1.86 1.31 1.51 1.65 1.46 1.31 1.54 4.42 1.36
100
INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY ATTRIBUTES ON INFLATION EQUATION WITH MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
OLS ·
explanatory var. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
c 7.91 1 0 .20 6.14 6.72 6.34 -24.1 68.81(0 22,18(0 9,78(*’‘) 0.09 1.1
Def/GDP •0.33 •0.34 •0.34 •0.36 •0.44 ^,29 •0.66 -0.37 •0.15 -0.16 0.01
m oneygr o,6 3 n 0,49(0 0 ,4 9 (0 0,52(0 0.55(*O 0,54(0 0.31 0,82(*’^ *) 0.49(**) 0,63C**) 0,65(*^ *)
Devair 0,40C*) 0.41(0 0 .4 5 0 0.41 (**) 0.38(*) 0,42(0 0 ,5r* ) 0.17 0,40(0 0,37("*) 0.31 (*)
domCR -0,08C*)
0,08(0 -0 .070 0.08(0 •0,07(0
-0.06(^ •0.11(*O -0,09("*") •0.09(*O -0.09(*"") •0,09(*‘")
govtbeh •0.91
Ul 0.76
inscont 0.22
em pcont 0.17
ERAm 35.26
ERAw -71,8(* )^
depratio -27.28
defSS/gdp -0.4
pubSS/Tpub 0,180
ContSS/expSS 0,08(*'‘)
R-square 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94
F-stat. 57.83 48.71 46.63 49.06 50.44 49.06 60.39 52.58 52.17 58.5 66.28
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APPKNDIX 4:C0RRKL.\T10N M.\TRL\
O
N )
Def.'gdp domCR rint realGDPpc grGDPpc Spriv GDPgr moneygr Devalr ıpopg·· Inf U ContSS/expSS
:-----------------1
Ul
Def/adp 1 00 -0.21 0.07 0.13 -0.55 0.009 -0.59 -0.02 0.2 -0.34 0.1 0.49 -0.14 0.008 0.23 -0.18 -0.05 -0 03
ERAm
n Oİ n no
defSS/GDP
domCR 1.00 -0.04 0.51 -0.1 0.27 -0.18 -0.36 -0.37 -0.13 -0.49 -0.2 0.35 0.06 -0.18 -0.29 -0.01 -0.08
“U.U l
-0 27
-0.25
n HA
-u.uy
n Oj4
0.31
rint 1.00 0.036 -0.27 -0.23 -0.19 -0.37 -0.39 0.2 -0.5 0.003 -0.21 -0.14 -0.3 0.28 0.15 0.23 o 1R
•U.UÖ U.04 
n n  ^4
-0.16
realGDpDc 1.00 -0.46 -0.07 -0.55 -0.5 -0.33 -0.42 -0.46 -0.17 0.16 0.1 -0.24 -0.5 0.27 -0 08
U. 1Q
n Ofi
U.Uı 1 0.23
orG O f^c 1.00 0.26 0.95 0.27 0.054 0.22 0.11 0.29 -0.25 0.03 0.025 0.13 0.06 -0.1
•U.UD 
-0 01
0.75
n KO
0.42
SpriV 1.00 0.17 0.12 0.11 -0.08 0.008 -0.27 -0.14 -0.09 0.28 -0.31 -0.17 -0.38 n A
-U.O^ -0.11
GDPor 1.00 0.36 0.1 0.43 0.18 -0.34 -0.33 -0.009 -0.08 0.33 -0.01 -0 01
•U.H
n HA O no
-0.31 0.12
monevor 1.00 0 9 0.26 0.92 -0.22 -0.28 0.031 0.06 0.44 -0.31 -0.15
-U.UO 
-O 1A
U.Uo -0.6 -0.13
Devaırr 1.00 0.09 0.92 -0.026 -0.21 0.007 0.12 0.19 -0.28 -0.3
•VJ. lO 
n 1Q
“0 45
n A 4
-0.55 -0.27
POlKir 1.00 0.13 -0.26 -0.09 -0.18 -0.36 0.6 -0.29 0 13
•U. 157
-0.23
•U.41 
n nc
-0.43 -0.18
fnf 1.00 -0.04 -0.13 0.06 0.16 -0.29 -0.33 -0 15 n OA
U.Uo
n AQ
-0.4 -0.19
İ Î 1.00 0.039 0.078 0.25 -0.46 0.02 0 23
•U.UO -U.4o 
n İ^ A
0.39 0.27
ContSSAejcoSS 1.00 0.002 0.24 -0.22 0.05 C\A n 4 Q
U.Ü4 0.45 0.35
inscont
1.00 -0.1 0.029 0.014
•U.UH
«n nn?
U.lö 0.02 0.38 -0.62
«nriDCont
1.00 -0.18 -0.19
“U.UUi
n
“U .n
n r\Â
-0.17 0.32 0.11
deoratio
1.00 -0 22
u.uo
0.41
U.Ü4 -0.16 -0.1 -0.29
oovbeth
1.00 .n 07
0.042
n OK
-0.13 -0.33 -0.11
Ul
“U.U/ Ü.ZO 0.32 0.24 0.22
ERAm
0.33 -0.09 0.26 0.16
ERAw
1.00 0.37 0.24 0.18
pubSSTTDub
1.00 0.06 0.32
dofSS/GDP
1.00 0.3
1.00
